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Twenty-five years ago, controversy raged over the size of the Supreme
Court's docket. Two very different concerns animated the critics: first, that
the Court's workload was unmanageably large; and second, that the Court's
capacity for deciding cases was no longer adequate in light of the burgeoning
caseload in the lower courts.' These concerns were considered so pressing
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.1. FEDERALJUDICLALCENTmREPoRTOFTHESTDYGROUPONTHECAsELOADOFTm.
SuPRmEa COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 577-84 (1972) [hereinafter FaEUND REPORT] (discussing
"Nature and Dimensions of the Problem" of Supreme Court's declining caseload).
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that scholars and legislators developed serious proposals to institute a national
court of appeals to relieve the Court's burden and to expand the total appellate

capacity.'
At that time, the Court was issuing about 150 plenary decisions per
Term.3 Just over a decade later, the Court's docket began to plunge, reaching
its modem nadir of 76 cases in the 1999 Term.4 With the plenary docket
reduced so dramatically, concerns about the Court's workload understandably
abated. Commentators, however, have remained strangely silent about the
second concern - whether the limited size of the Court's docket enables it
adequately to supervise and guide the lower courts.' This silence is all the
more surprising, given that the Court's production has now fallen so far below
the levels that alarmed commentators in the Burger Court era.
We think that issues concerning the appropriate size and shape of the

Supreme Court's plenary docket warrant further consideration. But in order
to have an informed discussion on those issues, it is first essential to develop
a more complete understanding of the causes of the dramatic change that
occurred between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. 6
2. See id. at 590-95 (examining proposal for National Court of Appeals); COMMISSION
oNREViSIONOF THEFEDERALCOURTAPPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCrUE AND INTERNALPROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199-247 (1975)
[hereinafter HRUSKA REPORT] (discussing proposal in significant detail).
3. See LEEEPSTEINETAL.,THE SUPPMECOURTCOMPENDIUM DATADECISIONS,AND
DEVELOPMENTS 84 tbl. 2-7 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SUPr AM COURT COMPENDIUM]. The
tabulation of "plenary decisions" reflects the Court's own statistics by including both signed
opinions and cases resulting inpercuriam opinions after oral argument
4. See id. at 84-85; StatisticalRecap of Supreme Court's WorkloadDuringLast Three
Terms, 69 U.S.L.W. 3134 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter StatisticalRecap](tabulating Supreme
Court's caseload); StatisticalRecap,66 U.S.,.W. 3136 (Aug. 12,1997) (same).
5. The last articles that expressed strong support for a national appellate court to reduce
the burden on the Supreme Court and still provide needed uniformity in national law were
published more than a decade ago. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme
Court?,51 U.PrrT. L. REV. 673 (1990); Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, Commentary: The Needfor a New NationalCourt,100 HARV. L. REV. 1400 (1987).
6. The sharp decline in the Court's docket has been widely recognized. See, e.g., Joan
Biskupic, A Different Sort of CourtAwaits Blackmun Successor: Recent Terms Marked by
Aversion to Change, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1994, at Al (discussing reduced docket); Glen
Elsasser, High CourtChoosesNot To Decide; JusticesExamineLowest Num ber of Cases Since
1960s, CHM TRIB., July 3, 1994, News Section, at 7 (same); David 0. Savage, DocketReflects
Ideological Shijfts: Shrinking Caseload, Cert Denials Suggest an Unfolding Agenda, 81
A.BA. J. 40 (Dec. 1995) (same); David 0. Stewart, Quiet Times: The Supreme CourtIs
Reducinglts Workload-But Why?, 80 ABA J. 40 (Oct. 1994) (same). There are, however,
only two scholarly articles discussing the phenomenon: Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken
Docket ofthe Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403 (1996), and David M. O'BrienJoin-3
Votes, the Rule ofFour,the Cert Pool,and the Supreme Court'sShrinkingPlenaryDocket,
13 J.L. & POL. 779 (1997).

THE SUPREME COURTS PLENARYDOCKET
In this Article, we present a comprehensive assessment of the causes of
this recent decline in the Supreme Court's plenary docket. We begin by
placing it in the broader context of how the plenary docket has ebbed and
flowed over the past century, which reveals an interesting historical parallel
to the post-war Court! We then examine in detail six explanations that have
been offered for the most recent decline. This leads us to consider a number
of diverse influences on the Supreme Court's plenary docket, such as the
changing contours of its appellate jurisdiction, the kinds of cases in which
applications for review are filed, the Justices' own internal practices, and how
the Court interacts with some of its most significant counterparts in the
judicial system, such as the Solicitor General and the lower courts. In each
instance, we develop and present new data that provides greater insight into
the relative merits of each theory, and that incidentally exposes some of the
myths that have'grown up around the Supreme Court's certiorari practice.8
We then turn to examine more carefully how changes in the Court's
personnel have affected its plenary docket.9 We approach this task by assembling new information on the Justices' conference votes, which is now available in the docket books of some of the recently retired Justices, and which
has never before been analyzed for these purposes."0 We use this information
to replicate some of the research that political scientists have conducted on
previous eras, which affords a fresh perspective on how the six retirements
that occurred between 1986 and 1994 have affected the plenary docket. This
approach also yields powerful data about the voting behavior of the Justices
in deciding how frequently to grant plenary review, which opens up many
interesting areas of inquiry into how the Court functions in setting its own
agenda." For purposes of this Article, in particular, this data makes it possible to present a more comprehensive explanation of why the Court's caseload
has declined to its lowest point in this century.

7. See infra Part I
8. See infra Part IA-IID.
9. See infra Part IE.
10. The Justices' docket books contain their personal records of the votes that the
individual Justices cast in every case at their private conferences both on applications for review
and on the merits. The docket books of Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall have been made
available to the public, either in whole or in part, in recent years. Our efforts to assemble the
pertinent figures were greatly facilitated by the generous assistance of personnel at the Program
for Law and Judicial Politics at Michigan State University, who have done extensive work in
compiling the conference votes. See infra note 227.
11. See, e.g., infra Part ILF (refuting theory that "cert pool," whereby most Justices now
share jointly their clerks' recommendations about whether to grant review in particular cases,
has tended to depress Court's plenary docket).
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I. QuantitativeChanges in the Court'sDocket
A. The Supreme Court'sPlenaryDocket
One feature of the Supreme Court's docket that has been completely
dependable over the past century is the steady increase in the number of cases
filed. From 386 in the 1895 Term, the number has mounted each decade to
6,597 in the 1995 Term. 12 Interestingly, however, this consistent increase in
cases available has not resulted in a corresponding increase in cases selected
for plenary review. For the last half-century, that figure has ranged from a
low of 76 (inthe 1999 Term) to a high of 158 (inthe 1972 Term).'" The result
has been a steady drop in the percentageof petitions for certiorari granted by
the Court - a number that hovered close to 20 per cent until the 1940s and
then commenced its fall to its current rate of about 3 per cent. 4
This state of affiirs is understandable: as the overall demand for the
Supreme Court's services has grown significantly, the maximum supply of
those services has remained virtually constant. It is also largely inevitable:
unless the Supreme Court is willing to accept either a large (and continuing)
increase in its backlog or a revolutionary (and anti-judicial) streamlining of its
procedures for deciding cases, the Court's argument calendar imposes a natural
ceiling on the number of plenary decisions that can be issued each Term. As
Professor Henry Hart cogently explained, the boundaries of the Court's calendar merely reflect the natural limitations upon the amount of time and work
that the Justices themselves can put in over the course of a given Term.' s
There are, of course, changes that can be made to the calendar that would
permit the Supreme Court to expand the potential supply of its plenary decisions. In 1970, for example, the Court modified its oral argument procedures,
which had presumptively allotted one hour for counsel to argue on each side,
by limiting counsel to only a half-hour per side in the typical case. 6 At a
12. See SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 71-76 tbl. 2-2. The following
numbers of new cases filed are illustrative: 1895 Term- 386; 1905 Term- 502; 1915 Term557; 1925 Term-790; 1935 Term- 983; 1945 Term- 1,316; 1955 Term- 1,644; 1965 Term2,774; 1975 Term- 3,939; 1985 Term -4,413; 1995 Term- 6,597. Id.
13. Id. at 84-85 tbL 2-7; StatisticalRecap, supra note 4, 69 U.S.L.W. at 3134; id., 66
U.S.L.W. at 3136.
14. See SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 80-83 tbls. 2-5 & 2-6. The
percentages provided in the text focus on paid petitions; the percentage of informa pauperis
petitions granted has always been lower, but has undergone a similar decline over the same
period, from about 4% to less than 0.3%. Id.
15. See Henry t. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices,73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 85-94
(1959) (explaining time necessary for Justices to complete various duties).
16. See David M. O'Brien, Managing the Business of the Supreme Court, 45 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 667, 671 (1985) (noting this change). Prior to 1970, however, the Court had
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stroke, therefore, the Court increased the number of plenary decisions that
could be issued per Term within the limits of its calendar. Around the same
time, however, the Court also reorganized its calendar by reducing the number
of argument days per week from 4 to 3, and by reducing the number of argument weeks per Term from 15 to 14.1' The overall increase in capacity was
nonetheless substantial, and it presumably encouraged the Court to expand its
plenary docket over the course of Chief Justice Burger's tenure.
Discussions about the Supreme Court's docket during this era focused on
whether the federal judiciary should undergo a broader institutional restructuring that would add even more capacity to help the Court cope with its rapidly
increasing workload."8 Serious attention was given to proposals to create a
new court of appeals that would have national decisionmaking authority,
thereby alleviating some of the burden on the Supreme Court, while at the
same time providing greater capacity to resolve those cases necessary to
achieve broader uniformity in federal law. Although proposals for such a
court took a variety of forms, 9 the most prominent was that embodied in the
Freund Report, which advocated the creation of a National Court of Appeals
to screen all applications for review (referring only the 400-500 deemed most
meritorious to the Supreme Court) and to resolve definitively some less
important cases involving circuit conflicts.2' Some commentators staunchly
placed an increasing number of argued cases on the so-called "summary docket," which allotted
the parties thirty minutes per side. See William 0. Douglas, The Supreme Courtand Its Case
Load,45 Coi, eLLL.Q. 401,411-12 (1960) (discussing Court's use of summary docket). The
effect of this procedural change was therefore less drastic than it might seem.
17. See SUPRmE CoURT CoMPENDrM, supranote 3, at 22 tbl. 1-1.
18. See Erwin N. Griswold,RationingJustice- The Supreme Court'sCaseloadand What
the CourtDoesNotDo,60 CoRxE.LL. REv. 335,337-53 (1975) (criticizing lack of nationally
binding appellate capacity and proposing new appellate tier); Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction
ofthe United States Supreme Court: Timefor a Change?, 59 CORNELL L.REV. 616, 617-33
(1974) (reviewing and making various proposals to alleviate Supreme Court's workload);
William H. Rehnquist, The ChangingRole ofthe Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 12
(1986) (arguing that there is need for greater national decisionmaking capacity and endorsing
new appellate tier).
19. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 2, at 199-247 (proposing national appellate court
with jurisdiction over cases assigned to it by Supreme Court as well as those transferred to it
by existing Courts of Appeals); Charles L. Black, Jr., The National Court ofAppeals: An
Unwise Proposal,83 YAIE LJ. 883, 898-99 (1974) (favoring inferior national court of appeals
that would resolve questions requiring uniformity, and judgments of which would be subject
to review by Supreme Court); Griswold, supra note 18, at 349-53 (proposing "National Court
of the United States" which would be assigned cases by Supreme Court); Frederick Bernays
Wiener, FederalRegional Courts: A Solutionfor the CertiorariDilemma,49 A3A.. 11169,
1169-74 (1963) (proposing system of federal regional courts).
20. See FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 590-95; see also William H. Alsup,A Policy
Assessment of The National Court of Appeals, 25 HAsToNGs L.J. 1313, 1323-42 (1974)
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opposed this proposal, contending either that the crisis had been misdiagnosed or that the functions proposed for the new court encroached too deeply
into the essential role of the Supreme Court.' The Justices also divided over
the merits of these proposals for a new appellate tier,' and ultimately the idea
withered away.
As the enthusiasm for a national court of appeals waxed and waned, the
pressure of the Supreme Court's caseload remained. One consequence was
that after more than a decade of importuning by the Justices, in 1988 the
Congress enacted legislation that eliminated most of the remaining vestiges
ofthe Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction.2 4 Both observers and participants judged that this measure would at least relieve the burden of deciding
cases presenting relatively trivial issues by granting the Court virtually total
control in determining which cases to accord plenary review.' Indeed, the
last time that Congress had enacted major changes inthe Court's jurisdictional
(appraising policy arguments for and against proposed National Court of Appeals); Baker &
McFarland, supra note 5, at 1400-09,1414-16 (arguing for national appellate court).
21.
See Henry J.Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L.
REV. 634, 634-46 (1974) (arguing that problem lies in ever-increasing number of cases flooding
into lower courts and offering proposals to decrease flow); Eugene Gressman, The Constitution
v. The FreundReport,41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 951,954-56 (1973) (doubting whether Supreme
Court is excessively overworked); Arthur D. Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the
Supreme Court: A Comment on JusticeRehnquist'sProposal,14FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 15,17-22
(1986) (contending that Supreme Court is not overworked and that it does have capacity to
resolve important circuit conflicts).
22. See Black, supra note 19, at 888-91 (arguing that screening function is essential to
Supreme Court); Gressman, supra note 21, at 951-70 (contending that proposed National Court
of Appeals would violate Article II's requirement that there be "one supreme Court*); Hellman,
supra note 21, at 27-32 (arguing that remitting issues to national appellate court would undermine Supreme Court's ability to function properly); Nathan Lewin, Helpingthe Court with Its
Work A Response to Goldbergand Bickel, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 1973, at 15, 17-18
(contending that screening function cannot be severed from Supreme Court).
23. See, e.g., William J.Brennan, Jr., The NationalCourt ofAppeals: Another Dissent,
40 U. CEI. L. REV. 473, 474-85 (1973) (criticizing proposal for national appellate court on
ground that screening function should not be removed from Supreme Court); Rehnquist, supra
note 18, at 12-14 (endorsing new tier of appellate courts); John Paul Stevens, Some Thoughts
on JudicialRestraint,66 JUDICATUIE 177, 182-83 (1982) (favoring national appellate court
with broader powers to define Supreme Court's docket).
24. See Review of Cases by the Supreme Court, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662
(1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254,1257-1258,2104 (1994)).
25. See S. REP. No. 100-300, at4 (Mar. 16,1988) (anticipating that legislation would
strengthen Court's "capacity both to control its own docket and to confine its labors to those
cases of national importance"); Bennett Boskey & Eugene (ressman, The Supreme CourtBids
Farewellto MandatoryAppeals, 121 F.R.D. 81, 98-99 (1988) (discussing effect of new legislation restricting Court's mandatory jurisdiction). A more complete explanation of these statutory changes, and a consideration of their effects, is presented infra in Part IA.
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statutes - in the Judiciary Act of 1925,26 which also reduced the Court's
mandatory appellate jurisdiction by transferring many cases over to its discretionary certiorari docket - the Court's workload declined dramaticallyY
After passage of that legislation, the number of signed opinions of the Court
dropped from 199 in the 1926 Term to 129 in the 1928 Term, though soon
thereafter the number rose substantially once again.'
B. The Recent Decline in the PlenaryDocket
Beginning in the 1989 Term, the Court's docket - which had remained
fairly constant at about 150 plenary decisions for the past decade - suddenly
began to decline. In the 1988 Term, the Court issued 145 plenary decisions;
in the 1989 Term, the number fell to 132; and in the 1990 Term, it fell to
116. 29 It dropped slightly to 110 in the 1991 Term, held steady at 111 during
the 1992 Term, then plunged to 90 inthe 1993 Term. ° At present, the number
of plenary decisions seems to have come to rest at a remarkably low plateau,
ranging from 76 to 92 over the seven most recent Terms.31
This unexpected development surprised and puzzled both participants
and observers. At his confirmation hearings in 1986, then-Justice Rehquist
said, "I think the 150 cases that we have turned out quite regularly over a
period of 10 or 15 years is just about where we should be at.132 Indeed, in
response to questioning about whether the size of that caseload might be too
great for effective administration, he stated more pointedly, "[m]y own feeling
26. Act of Feb. 13, 1925,43 Stat. 936,937 (1925).
27. ROBERTL. STE NET AL., SUPREME COURTPRACTICE 163(7th ed. 1993) [hereinafter
STERN & GRESSMAN] (noting that 1925 Act "gave the Court flexible but firm control over the

main body of its work" and "substantially reduced the number of mandatory appeals on the
Court's docket").
28. SUPREME CouRT CoMPENDmiu, supra note 3, at 84 thl. 2-7. The number of"signed
opinions" is used here, rather than plenary decisions, because the tabulations do not include the
number ofunsignedper curiam opinions until the 1940 Term.
29. Id. at 85 tbL 2-7. It could be suggested that the decline began after the 1986 Term,
in which 155 plenary decisions were issued, with the numbers falling to 148 in the 1987 Term
and to 145 in the 1988 Term. See id. We examine the causes of the decline in order to reassess
its chronology infra in Part ILE.
30. Id.at 85 tbl. 2-7.
31. The precise number of plenary decisions in the most recent Terms is: 1994 Term 85; 1995 Term-78; 1996 Term- 83; 1997 Term-92; 1998 Term-79; 1999 Term-76; 2000
Term- 79. See StatisticalRecap,supranote 4,69 U.S.L.W. at 3134; id., 66 U.S.L.W. at3136.
In 1996, Professor Hellman saw signs that "the era of shrinkage in the plenary docket may be
ending," Hellman, supra note 6, at 438, but it is now clear that this projection was incorrect
32. Hearingsbefore the Committeeon theJudiciaryUnitedStatesSenateon the Nominalon ofJustice William Hubbs Rehnquist to be ChiefJustice of the United States, 99th Cong.
143 (1986) (statement of Hon. William H. Rehnquist).
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is that al the courts are so much busier today than they have been in the past,
that there would be something almost unseemly about the Supreme Court
saying, you know, everybody else is deciding twice as many cases as they ever
have before, but we are going to go back to two-thirds as many as we did
before."33 Justice Souter, who arrived at the Court in the midst of this dramatic decline, said he has been "amazed" at the trend, which he suggests has
'Just happened" without any conscious decision on the Justices' part.3 4

Commentators also recognized and were perplexed by the marked

decline.35 Although some offered possible explanations for the decline, most

of that discussion was tentative and came too soon to benefit from the kind of
detailed investigation of additional data that is necessary to test the various
hypotheses adequately.3 6 Some commentators on the decline expressed
frustration that the Court's already precious resources were not being fully
utilized 31 whereas others dispensed praise38 or blame, 39 according to their
views about the proper role of the Supreme Court in national life. The individual Justices who noted the phenomenon offered only vague
and uncertain
40

rationales for what may have happened to bring it about.

Two scholarly commentators have examined some possible causes of
the current situation, which has led them to suggest that it may be largely
attributed to changes in personnel on the Court.41 Professor David M. O'Brien
33. Id. at 173-74.
34. Shannon P. Duffy,Inside the HighestCourt; SouterDescribesJustices'Relationship,
CaseloadTrend, PA. L. WKLY., Apr. 17,1995, at 11.
35. See, e.g., Biskupic, supra note 6, at Al (discussing Court's reduced caseload); Ruth
Marcus, High Court'sCaseload is Unprecedentedly Light,WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1990, at A4
(same); Stewart, supranote 6, at 40-44 (same).
36. See Joan BiskupicAsAppealsProliferate,CourtTakes FewerCases; On the Docket:
Free Speech, Voting Rights, WAS. POST, Oct 4, 1993, at A6 (discussing possible reasons but
coming to no definite conclusions); Elsasser, supra note 6, at 7 (same); Savage, supra note 6,
at 40-42 (same).
37. See James J.Kilpatrick, Slow Days at the Supreme Court,INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept
7,1999, at A14; Joan Biskupic, The ShrinkingDocket; Attorneys Try to Make an Issue out of
the DramaticDecline in High CourtRulings,WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 1996, at A1S [hereinafter
Shrinking Docket]; Savage, supra note 6, at 40-42; Kenneth W. Starr, Rule ofSupreme Court
Needs aManagementRevolt,WALL ST. J., Oct 13, 1993, atA23.
38. See Marcus,supranote 35, atA4 (quoting comments byBruce Fein and Andrew Frey).
39. See Elsasser, supra note 6, at 7 (quoting comments by Mark Tushnet and Lawrence
Marshall); Starr, supranote 37, atA23.
40. See Dufly, supra note 34, at 11 (quoting Justice Souter); Biskupic, supranote 6, at
Al (quoting Justice White); Hellman, supra note 6, at 409 (quoting Justice Kennedy).
41. See Helman, supra note 6, at 429-33 (suggesting "a new court" brought "a new
philosophy" to case selection); O'Brien, supra note 6, at 788-89, 803-07 (hypothesizing that
changes in Court's composition led to changes in plenary docket).
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analyzed some of the Court's internal procedural mechanisms in an effort
to shed light on the problem. 42 Professor Arthur D. Hellman took a different approach by scrutinizing the actual mix of cases on the plenary docket in
order to evaluate various hypotheses that have been given currency by other
commentators or by the Justices themselves.43 Yet neither study uses data
available from the dockets books of the retired Justices, which record the
Justices' conference votes on whether to grant review in particular cases, to
develop direct evidence that would be more definitive about how changes in
the Court's membership affected its plenary docket.' Their specific analyses
of the decline will be discussed in more detail as we examine its causes
45
below.
C. HistoricalPerspective on the PlenaryDocket
No effort has previously been made to place the recent changes in
the docket into a broader historical perspective. In fact, the current trend
is not unprecedented. Counting forward from the 1926 Term - the first in
which the Supreme Court enjoyed substantial control over its own docket45 the trajectory of the Court's plenary docket divides into five fhirly distinct
periods.
The immediate effect ofthe 1925 legislation, as noted previously, was to
reduce the number of the Court's signed opinions dramatically, from 199 in
the 1926 Term to 129 in the 1928 Term.47 Almost immediately, however,
these numbers spiked up again, remaining relatively constant at an average of
about 150 plenary decisions per Term for the next 15 years.4" At that point,
the numbers fell precipitously, from 150 inthe 1946 Term, to 124 and 132 in
the 1947 and 1948 Terms, to 101 inthe 1949 Term. For the next seven years,
the Court issued an average of slightly more than 100 plenary decisions per
Term. Beginning in the 1956 Term, the docket again showed a measurable
increase, rising from 100 to 123 plenary decisions. For the next 15 years, the
Court issued an average of about 120 plenary decisions per Term. Inthe 1971
Term, the docket jumped once more, and for almost two decades thereafter the
42. See O'Brien,supra note 6, at 784-807.
43. See Hellman,supra note 6, at 404-25.
44. Professor Hellman does not refer to conference votes at all. See id. Professor
O'Brien uses them only to identify one limited type of procedural vote, and even then only in
cases where the Court actually granted review. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 797-98.
45. See infra Part IL
46. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (describing Judiciary Act of 1925, which
substantially reduced Court's mandatory jurisdiction).
47. SUPREME COURT CoMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 84 tbl. 2-7.
48. Id. The figures set forth in this paragraph of the text all derive from this same table.
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Court again issued about 150 plenary decisions per Term. 9 The most recent
sharp decline commenced in the late 1980s.
Of particular interest, the current decline in the Supreme Court's plenary
docket has a precise analog in the era just after World War II, when Chief
Justice Vinson was appointed to preside over the Court. Then, as now, the
Court had experienced a prolonged period of relatively full dockets, issuing
an average of about 150 plenary decisions per Term. Suddenly, in just three
Terms, the numbers fell to around 100 decisions per Term, where they remained for almost a decade. The most recent decline is comparable, and has
now proved even more durable. The reasons for this earlier decline may thus
offer clues that will help to explain the current decline.
It is assuredly difficult to isolate the reasons that underlie changes effected within an institution as complex and secretive as the Supreme Court. In
that era, as in this one, many external factors conceivably could have contributed to the decline in the plenary docket. The volume of litigation may well
have diminished during the years in which the United States was engaged
in World War II, which would have meant a subsequent decline in cases
wending their way to the Supreme Court. The flood of legislative activity on
the domestic front during the Great Depression diminished during the next
decade, which might also have reduced the number of decisional conflicts
among the lower courts. This era also encompassed the waning years of a
period of prolonged single-party control of the Presidency, which generally
imposes some degree of realignment on the lower courts; the resulting harmony in judicial philosophy would be expected to minimize conflicts among
the courts that would justify plenary review.50 Finally, the Supreme Court
itself had recently announced its withdrawal from two areas of prior contention by overruling its activist precedents on economic due process issues51 and
49. Professor Hellman notes that during this period, "'[o]ne hundred fifty cases per year'
came to be regarded both as a maximum and a norm for the plenary docket" Hellman, supra
note 6, at 403 (quoting Peter L. Strauss, One HundredFifty CasesPer Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resourcesfor Judicial Review ofAgencyAcion, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093 (1987)).
50. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman appointed 13 Supreme Court Justices, replacing
every seat on the Court SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 225 tbl. 4-1. When
President Truman left office in 1953, 54 of the 64 circuit judges had been appointed either by
him or by his predecessor. Compare Federal Judges, 199 F.2d vii-xv (1953), with Federal
Judges, 62 F.2d v-ix (1933).
51. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941) (overruling Ribnikv. McBride, 277
U.S. 350 (1928), to uphold state law setting maximum fee that employment agency could collect
for placing employees); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (overruling Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), to uphold federal labor law barring employers from
encouraging or discouraging union membership); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), to uphold state minimum
wage law for women).
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by abandoning virtually all adjudication of common law claims.52
It is doubtful, however, whether any of these explanations - taken alone
or together - goes very far to explain the trimming ofthe docket by the Vinson
Court. Thepace oflitigationwas sluggish duringthe 1930s, perhaps depressed
by economic conditions, and though the number of cases filed in the Supreme
Court had changed little during that time, it gradually increased during the
1940s by about 25 per cent.53 The extent ofcongressional action onthe domestic front was probably less influential for our purposes than the cumulative
growth of federal laws and agency actions, augmented by new legal problems
created by wartime conditions. The prospect ofjudicial realignment may be
more to the point, though Presidents often find it surprisingly hard to impose
a comprehensive judicial philosophy upon even the Supreme Court itself, let
alone upon the judicial system throughout the entire country.5 4 Finally, though
the Court did pull back on economic due process and state common law cases,
these changes had occurred almost a decade earlier. Moreover, they were
probably offset by a profusion of new procedural issues5 5 and by the Court's
growing assertiveness in exercising the power of judicial review to determine
the constitutional rights of individual citizens. 6
Indeed, the studies now published on the workings ofthe Vinson Court,57
which include detailed analyses ofthe approach that the Court tookto granting
plenary review, point to one overriding factor - changes in personnel - that
seems to explain its reduced docket. Upon his appointment to the Court, Chief
Justice Vinson viewed it as an important part of his mission to reduce the
"conspicuous fractiousness" among its members.5" One of his strategies was
"to cut down the caseload to more manageable proportions, perhaps in order
to reduce opportunities for division."59 He thus came to the Court consciously
52. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. 1 (1842), and holding that there is no federal general common law).
53. See SUPREw COURT COMPENDUM, supranote 3, at 73-74 tbl. 2-2.
54. See infra Part ILD (discussing concept ofjudicial realignment).
55. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645 (1938) (setting out new rules governing
civil procedure in federal courts, which became effective on September 16, 1938).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that "more searching judicial inquiry" is necessary when laws are "within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth," and when laws are "directed
at particular religious or national or racial minorities") (citations omitted); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319,325 (1937) (sanctioning incorporation ofBill ofRights against States when rights
asserted are regarded as "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").

57.

See JAN PALMER, THE VINSON COURT ERA- THE SUPREME COURT'S CONFERENCE

VOTES; DATA AND ANALYsis (1990); Dolis MARm PROVINE, CASE SE[ECTIONINTHEUNrBD
STATES SUPREME COURT (1980).
58. DENNJ.HUTCHNSoN, THE-MANWHOWASONcEWHZZEWHI201 (1998).
59. Id.
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determined to exert his influence to reduce the size of the docket, which he
could do in part by casting his own vote less frequently in favor of plenary
review, and in part by attempting to persuade his colleagues to do the same.
Fortunately, the availability of Justice Burton's docket books (and those
of certain other Justices) has permitted scholars to assemble figures on the
voting patterns of each Justice on the Vinson Court." The data confirms that
Chief Justice Vinson accomplished at least the first part of his task, voting to
grant certiorari review in fewer cases during his first three Terms than anyone
other than Justice Jackson, and voting least frequently to note probable
jurisdiction in cases on appeal.61 Although it is not clear that-the Chief Justice
managed to exert any significant influence on the votes cast by his colleagues,
the withholding of his own vote sufficed to cause at least a modest decline in
the docket over this period. 2
At that juncture, fate took a hand. On July 19, 1949, Justice Murphy
died. Less than two months later, on September 10, 1949, Justice Rutledge
also died unexpectedly. President Truman thus made two new appointments
to the Court between the 1948 and 1949 Terms. The nominees were Tom C.
Clark and Sherman Minton, and the Senate promptly confirmed both. Chief
Justice Vinson carried great sway with President Truman in nominating the
two men - Minton had served with Vinson in the Congress, and Clark had
served with Vinson in Truman's Cabinet. 3
On the Court, both men immediately proved to be even less inclined to
grant plenary review than the Chief Justice, who still ranked below the rest of
the Justices in this regard.' Justice Minton, in particular, voted to grant plenary review in far fewer cases than any other member ofthe Court - 210 times
on certiorari and 69 times on appeal overthe next four Terms, as compared with
641 and 137 for Justice Black, who topped the list.65 Even more important,
however, was the fact that the two Justices they replaced had been among the
most willing to grant plenary review during the three previous Terms. Justice
Murphy, in fact, had cast the most votes for certiorari over that span (462), and
Justice Rutledge had tied Justice Douglas for the second most (3 9 2 ).' To put
60. See PAIIER, supra note 57, at 34-49 (explaining how data on conference votes was
gathered from collected private papers of various Justices and describing possible sources of
error in particular cases).
61. See id.at 56 tbl. 5.1 & 79 tbl. 6.1.
62. See SuPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 84 tbl. 2-7 (1946 Term - 150
plenary decisions; 1947 Term- 124 plenary decisions; 1948 Term- 132 plenary decisions).
63. See PAILMER, supranote 57, at 6-14 (providing biographical information of Vinsonera Justices).
64. See id. at 57 tbl. 5-2 & 81 tbl. 6.2 (compiling voting data from Vinson Court).
65. Id
66. Id.at56tbl.5.1 &79tbl. 6.1.
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the consequences in starker perspective, the average number of votes for
plenary review cast per Term by the two former Justices was 340 (159 by
Rutledge, 181 by Murphy), but for the two new Justices, this same figure sank
to only 174 (70 by Minton, 104 by Clark).67 It is a telling demonstration ofthe
independent significance ofthese two changes in personnel that over the same
period, the average rate at which every one of-the holdover Justices (including
Chief Justice Vinson) voted to grant plenary review actually increased'
The effect on the Court's docket was dramatic. The slight decline initiated by Chief Justice Vinson now took on the aura of a full-scale retreat, as
the number of plenary decisions immediately collapsed to 101 cases in the
1949 Tenm. 69 It would not climb back above 114 cases until the 1956 Term,
after both Vinson and Minton left the Court,70 even though the Court was
bombarded with academic criticism excoriating the Justices for evading their
responsibilities by declining to review and decide major cases.71
The lessons from this brief case study ofthe Vinson Court are clear-cut,
largely because the figures compiled from the Justices' conference votes have
such powerful explanatory force. This data shows that though it is possible
that external factors may have contributed modestly to the decline in the
plenary docket, the most obvious and compelling explanation is simply that
changes in personnel created a Supreme Court that, as a collective body, was
This state of affairs lasted until the
much less inclined to grant review.
67.
68.

Id. at 56-57, 79,81 (calculated from Tables 5.1,5.2,6.1 & 6.2).
See PAIdMER, supra note 57, at 56-57 tbls. 5.1 & 5.2 & 79-81 tbls. 6.1 & 6.2 (tabulat-

ing voting); PRovIN, supra note 57, at 114-115 &tbl. 4.5 (calculating Justices' "propensity
to vote for review").
69. See SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 84 tbl. 2-7 (1949 Term- 101
plenary decisions; 1950 Term - 106 plenary decisions; 1951 Term- 108 plenary decisions).
70. Id.
71. See Fowler V. Harper & Alan S. Rosenthan, What the Supreme CourtDidNotDo in
the 1949 Term -AnAppraisal of Certiorari,99 U. PA. L. REV. 293 (1950) (discussing Court's

denial of review in many important cases); Fowler V.Harper & Edwin D. Etherington, What
the Supreme CourtDidNotDoDuringthe 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REV.354 (1951) (same);
Fowler V. Harper & George C. Pratt, What the Supreme CourtDid Not Do Duringthe 1951
Term, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1953) (same); Fowler V. Harper & Arnold Leibowitz, What the
Supreme CourtDidNotDoDuringthe1952 Term, 102 U. PA.L. REv. 427 (1954) (same); John
P. Frank, The UnitedStates Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHL L. REV. 165, 216-17 (1952)
(criticizing "the rigidity with which the writ of certiorari is being granted" and wondering:
"What is the Court saving itself for?"); Fred Rodell, Our Not So Supreme Court,LOOK, July 31,
1951, at 60 (discussing how Court's plenary docket "has plummeted to a new and scandalous

low" due in part to "comparative incompetence and part to sheer laziness").
72. See FRED RoDEILNINEMEN: APOITMCALHISTORYOFTBESUPEMECOURTOFTHE
UNITED STATES FROM 1790 TO 1955, at 314 (Vintage Books 1964) (referring to Vinson Court's

"new spendthrift use of 'denial of certiorari' to refuse even to hear a lot of important cases and
thus to cut the Justices' work-load down to a twentieth-century low"); John P. Frank, Fred
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personnel changed again; after Earl Warren replaced Vinson as Chief Justice
and established himself, and after William Brennan replaced Justice Minton,
the plenary docket expanded once again as a consequence of their greater
willingness to vote in favor of granting review."3 This analog is illuminating
as we turn to evaluate the causes that lie behind the current version of the

Court's shrinking docket.
H PossibleExplanationsfor the Recent Decline
Lawyers, commentators, and even the Justices themselves have hypothesized a variety of causes for the drop in the Supreme Court's plenary docket
over the past decade. For the most part, however, these theories have remained mostly speculative and have not been satisfactorily evaluated in light
of numerical data that would allow them to be either verified or falsified.74
This problem occurs because the close secrecy of the Court's internal deliber-

ations makes it difficult to quantify the Justices' voting behavior in conference. In the discussion that follows, we attempt to draw upon the available

data in new ways to amass the kinds of information that make it possible to
test hypotheses more carefully and to draw more definite conclusions. In
addition, one must consider the timing of each proposed explanation because

a theory can be ruled out if its application does not correspond to the actual
rise and fall of the plenary docket.75
Vinson and the ChiefJusticeship,21 U. CBL L. REV. 212,239-40 & n.91 (1954) (noting in his
seventh annual article on Supreme Court's work that "the theme of this series of articles" has
been that "the Court is turning away too much business with its use of its certiorari discretion").
73. See PROVDIN, supra note 57, at 114-15 tbl. 4.5 (comparing voting patterns of
Justices); SUPmEME COURT COMPENDIIUM, supranote 3, at 84 tbl. 2-7 (1956 Term- 123 plenary
decisions; 1957 Term- 131 plenary decisions; 1958 Term- 122 plenary decisions).
74. The one notable exception in this regard is Professor Hellman, whose work attempts
to group the Court's caseload into different substantive categories and to draw conclusions from
the rate of change in the number of cases on the plenary docket in each category. See Hellman,
supranote 6, at 408-29. Indeed, as will be noted, our data tends to confirm some of his conclusions. See infra Part ILB (examining number of actions filed in particular subject areas).
Yet because his work makes no use of the data available on conference votes from the docket
books of various retired Justices, it is necessarily limited, and in particular his discussion of the
effect of recent retirements on the direction of the Court is largely anecdotal. See Hellman,
supranote 6, at 429-32; see also infra Part I.E (discussing effect of changes in personnel on
Court's docket).
75. For example, it has been suggested that perhaps Congress has been enacting fewer
new statutes and thus spawning fewer new cases to interpret them. See, e.g., Dufly, supranote
34, at 11 (quoting Justice Souter suggesting this); David 3. Garrow, The RehnquistReins,N.Y.
TIml, Oct. 6, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 65. Yet it is difficult to understand the timing here,
since there is no clear correlation between congressional output (or state legislative output) and
the recent decline in the plenary docket, particularly when the cumulation of statutes to be construed is taken into consideration. Presumably this explanation would have its roots in the
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A. Elimination of the Court'sMandatoryJurisdiction
In seeking explanations for the recent decline in the Court's plenary

docket, one obvious (but ultimately unpersuasive) candidate is the almost

wholesale repeal of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction.76 Prior to 1988, the
Supreme Court enjoyed discretion to determine whether to review most of the
cases coming before it, but several important statutes gave litigants a right of

appeal to the Supreme Court. In 1988, atthe Court's urging, Congress eliminated virtually all of these mandatory appeal provisions, substituting instead
discretionary review on certiorari."
The 1988 legislation made three major changes: First, it repealed 28
U.S.C. § 1252, which allowed any party in a civil action to appeal directly to
the Supreme Court from any decision of any federal court declaring a federal
statute to be unconstitutional, ifthe United States was a party to the lawsuit."

Second, the Act repealed 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), which allowed a party to
appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of a federal court of appeals
striking down a state statute as violative of the federal Constitution, treaties,
or laws. 9 Third, the legislation repealed 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(1) and (2), which
allowed a party to appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment of a state

court of last resort holding either that a federal statute or treaty was invalid,
or that a state statute was valid despite a challenge based on the federal

Constitution, treaties, or laws."
gridlock created by divided government, yet the only period since 1980 in which partisan control of the Presidency and both houses of Congress was in the same hands was in the 103rd
Congress, from 1993-94, which did not correspond to any subsequentrise inthe Court's plenary
docket.
76. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 408-12 (discussing this theory); O'Brien, supra note
6, at 781-82 (same).
77. See Review of Cases by the Supreme Court, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat 662
(1988). The same essential change had been recommended for at least two decades. See, e.g.,
FREUND REPORT, supra note 1, at 595-605 (proposing that all cases be brought to Supreme
Court by certiorari).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (repealed 1988). Under the new regime, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254, parties losing at the district court level will now first have to appeal to the circuit court,
and any party dissatisfied with the result there will then have to file a petition for certiorari to
the Supreme Court. However, if either party believes that the district court's ruling of unconstitutionality warrants immediate review by the Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) continues
to permit that party to docket the case in the court of appeals and then to immediately file a petition for certiorari that would allow the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to consider the case
directly from the district court See Boskey & Gressman, supra note 25, at 95 (discussing and
commenting on this procedure).
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (repealed 1988) (permitting this appeal procedure).
80. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257(1) & (2) (repealed 1988) (permitting these appeals from state
courts); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1258 (repealed 1988) (duplicating these appeal provisions for
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These statutory changes stripped away most of the Court's mandatory

jurisdiction."1 All that remains are 28 U.S.C. § 1253, which allows appeals

in civil injunctive actions from cases before three-judge district courts," and
the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, which permits a direct
appeal to the Supreme Court in a tightly limited class of civil antitrust cases,
but still gives the Supreme Court "discretion!' to "deny the direct appeal and
remand the case to the court of appeals." 3 These few remaining obligations
add "very little to the Court's workload."8 4
There were at least three reasons to believe that this virtual elimination

of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction might have been a significant factor
contributing to the decline in the docket. First, as noted earlier, Congress's

1925 modifications of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional statutes led to an

immediate and dramatic drop in the Court's caseload.8 5 Although the
amount

of mandatory jurisdiction remaining in 1988 was much diminished, it would
be sensible to expect some further decline to flow from additional legislative changes made in the same direction. Second, the timing is right, as the
enactment of the 1988 legislation occurred around the beginning of the
parties seeking review ofjudgment of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico). Prior to the repeal of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1257(1) and (2), parties had the option to seek certiorari rather than appeal, see 28
U.S.C. § 1257(3) (now redesignated § 1257(a) by 1988 legislation).
81. In addition, the 1988 legislation amended other more specific statutory provisions to
substitute certiorari review for appeals as of right. These provisions had previously allowed
appeals in cases arising under an array of stattes: the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971,
codified at2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (amended 1988); the Act of May 18, 1928, codified at25 U.S.C.
§ 652 (amended 1988); the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1652(d) (amended 1988); the Regional Rail ReorganizationAct of 1973, codified at 45 U.S.C.
§§ 719(eX3) and 743(d) (amended 1988); the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,
codified at 45 U.S.C. § l105(b) (amended 1988); the International Claims Settlement Act of
1949, codified at 22 U.S.C. § 1631(e) (amended 1988); the Saint Lawrence Seaway Act,
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 988(a) (amended 1988); and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136w(aX4) (amended 1988).
82. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1994) (permitting appeals from panels of district judges).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1994); see also STERN & GRESSMAN, supranote 27, at 50-55 (discussing this provision).
84. Boskey & Gressman, supra note 25, at 97. Indeed, in the ten Terms from 1984 to
1993, there were a fotal of thirteen plenary appeals from three-judge district courts, amounting
on average to only one per Term. The antitrust appeal statute has not brought a ease to the
Court since the AT&T litigation almost two decades ago. See United States v. AT&T Co., 552
F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
That statute recently regained prominence in the government litigation against Microsoft. See
Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (denying certiorari and remanding case
to D.C. Circuit).
85. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text (describing Judiciary Act of 1925 and
its effect on Court's docket).
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decline.8 6 Third, the Justices themselves seemed convinced that this change
would relieve some of the pressure on their docket, at a minimum by freeing
up precious time for cases of greater import.8 7
Indeed, the Justices had pressed Congress hard to eliminate the Court's
mandatory jurisdiction in favor of allowing them to exercise almost complete
discretion over the docket. In letters to Congress in 1982 and 1978, the

Justices offered two rationales for the change."8 First, the Justices argued that
the mandatory jurisdiction statutes required them to give plenary review to
cases that did not necessarily present issues of national importance or con-

cern. 9 Second, the Justices noted that, because of the crush of work at the
Court, they had to decide many appeals through summary dispositions, which
are "uncertain guides to the courts bound to follow them and not infrequently
create more confusion than clarity."' The Justices thus advised Congress of
their view that it was "imperative that the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court
'
be substantially eliminated."91
The Justices' first reason - that the mandatory jurisdiction statutes
required them to give plenary review to cases that did not present issues of
sufficient import to merit such treatment - strongly suggests that repeal of
these statutes would cause the Court to cut back significantly in reviewing
these types of cases. In 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist estimated that the
changes would slice off fifteen to twenty cases per Term:
If we look at the cases decided on the merits during the last five terms of our
Court, the cases decided onthe merits which camebywayofappeal ratherthan
86. The Act took effect on September 25, 1988 and applied to all cases in which the judgment of the relevant lower court had not yet been entered as of that date. See Review of Cases
by the Supreme Court, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat 662 (1988). As noted earlier, the most
significant decline in the Court's plenary docket commenced in the 1989 Term, as the following
numbers indicate: 1988 Term - 145 decisions; 1989 Term - 132 decisions; 1990 Term - 116
decisions; 1991 Term - 110 decisions. Supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
87. See Letter from all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Congressman
Kastenmeier (June 17, 1982) (reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 100-660, appendix (May 26, 1988))
[hereinafter Justices' 1982 Letter] ("The more time the Court must devote to [mandatory
appeals,] the less time it has to spend on the more important cases facing the nation.").
88. See id.; Letter from all nine Justices of the United States Supreme Court to Senator
DeConcini (June 22, 1978) (reprinted in Eugene Gressman, Requiem for the Supreme Court's
Obligatory Jurisdiction,65 A.B.A J. 1325, 1328 (1979)) [hereinafter Justices' 1978 Letter].
89. Justices' 1982 Letter, supra note 87; Justices' 1978 Letter, supra note 88. The
Justices further explained that it was necessary to give such cases plenary review because even
cases of trivial public import may involve difficult legal issues that require full argument and
briefing before the Court can gain sufficient assurance that it is deciding them correctly.
Justices'1982 Letter,supranote 87; Justices' 1978 Letter, supranote 88.
90. Justices' 1978 Letter, supranote 88; see alsoJustices' 1982Letter,supra note 87.
91. Justices' 1982 Letter, supranote 87; see alsoJustices' 1978Letter,supra note 88.
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by way ofcertiorari averaged aboutthirty-five per term. That's thirty-five out
ofroughly a hundred and fifty. Because these cases came by way ofappeal, we
had much less latitude in dealingwith them than we would have had had they
come by way of certiorari.... Perhaps we would have granted certiorari in
some ofthese cases had they come to us that way rather thanby appeal. But if
you assume that in only half of them certiorari would have been denied, this
change would give us some fifteen or twenty new slots, to use the airport
suffiterminology, for other cases which our Court would have considered
92
ciently important to warrant granting discretionary review of

It is demonstrable that the Court did, at least on occasion, grant full
review to an appeal that it would not otherwise have taken on certiorari.'
Some commentators, however, opined that the Court was already applying the

functional equivalent of its standards for granting certiorari in deciding
whether to accord plenary treatment to cases on appeal. 4 The Justices accomplished this by disposing of unmeritorious appeals by dismissing them "for
want of a substantial federal question,"95 which had been a regular practice for
92. Boskey & Grcessman, supranote 25, at 98-99 (quoting remarks at annual meeting of
American Law Institute, May 19, 1987); see also id. at 98 (estimating that "between 12 and 20
of the approximately 150 argued cases per term have been mandatory appeals which would not
have made their way to the argument calendar if their prescribed route had been by petition for
certiorari instead of appeal"). Justice Kennedy later commented that the numbers may have
been even higher. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 409 (quoting Justice Kennedy testifying before
Congress).
93.

InRockfordLife Ins. Co. v.fllinoisDep'tofRevenue,482 U.S. 182 (1987), for exam-

ple, the Court complained:
The issue presented is not the type that would usually merit our attention if presented
in a petition for certiorari. The issue has divided neither the federal courts of appeals
nor the state courts. Indeed, aside from the Illinois courts, no court has ever considered
whether Ginnie Maes are exempt from state taxes. Nor does it appear that this case
presents an overly important question of federal law "which has not been, but should be,
settled by this Court." This Court's Rule 17.1(c). The fact is that the Illinois property
tax imposed here was repealed in 1979. Nonetheless, this case arises under our mandatory jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and Congress has not allowed us to consider
these factors in deciding whether to rule on this case on its merits.
Id. at 184 n-3.
94. See, e.g., W.L PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SEIrTNG IN THE UNTED
STATES SUPREME CoURT 104-06 (1991) (discussing substantial similarity in treatment between
appeals and grants of certiorari); PROVINE, supra note 57, at 13-17 (same); Samuel Estreicher
& John Sexton, A ManagerialTheory ofthe Supreme Court'sResponsibilities: An Empirical

Study, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681,799 (1984) (same); see also HR. REP. No. 100-660, at 12 (May
26, 1988) (noting that Supreme Court "has necessarily come to treat cases that require review
as the functional equivalent of, and under the same standards as, cases that are reviewed on a
discretionary basis").
95. See, e.g., Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 936 (1985) (dismissing appeal);
Hamilton v. California, 474 U.S. 1016 (1985) (same). This treatment of an appeal from a state
court succeeded in rendering a final disposition, but obviated the need to schedule the case for
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decades.' If this view were correct, repeal of the mandatory jurisdiction statutes would still have the beneficial effect of eliminating the need for summary
dispositions and the time-consuming task of resolving technical jurisdictional
issues, but it would have no appreciable effect on the size of the plenary

docket. 9'

Although this debate largely preceded Congress's action, it nonetheless
frames the current question: Did the virtual elimination ofthe Supreme Court's

mandatory jurisdiction meaningfully contribute to the decline in its docket? As

Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, 't there is no way of knowing how many of
the appeals would have been granted as petitions for certiorari.I However, we

can develop a close proxy for the answer by comparing: (i) the number of
appeals accorded plenary review inthe four Terms prior to the 1988 legislation;
with (ii) the number of cases granted review on certiorari in which the parties
previously would have had a right of appeal, inthe four Terms after the legislation had become fully effective.'
In order to make the first part of-this comparison, we counted the number
of appeals on the plenary docket for each Term from 1984-1987. During that
period, the Court gave full consideration to a total of 108 appeals."°
plenary review or to prepare a written opinion that analyzed the legal issues at stake. Appeals
from the lower federal courts that were regarded as insubstantial were summarily dispatched in
similar fashion by a bare order of affirmance. See ROBERT L. STERNET AL., SuPPEM COURT
PRACTICE 108,239-46,295 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter STERN& GRESSMAN, S]XTI{EDriON]
(describing this process).
96. See, e.g., Harold B. Wiley, JurisdictionalStatements on Appeals to U.S. Supreme
Court,31 ABA. J. 239, 240 (1945) (discussing this practice); FREUND REPORT, supra note 1,

at 595-96 ("The discretionary-mandatory distinction between certiorari and appeal has been
largely eroded. The concept that all appeals are argued while most certiorari cases are disposed
of summarily has not been true for many years.").
97. See HIR REP. No. 100-660, at 11 (May 26, 1988) (citing as reason for repeal of
mandatory jurisdiction statutes concern that "the Court is required to spend inordinate amounts
of time considering arcane and technical provisions of its jurisdiction").
98. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Congressman Kastenmeier, Subcommittee Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary (Dec. 2, 1987). This excerpt of
the letter is reprinted in S. REP. No. 100-300, at 2 (Mar. 16, 1988). Professor Hellman also felt
himself to be stymied in this respect, opining that "[w]e have no way of knowing" whether in
the later period the Court denied certiorari in "cases which, if they had come up by appeal,
would have received plenary consideration." Hellman, supra note 6, at 412.
99. The legislation became effective on September 25, 1988, but cases then pending in
the Supreme Court and cases in which the relevant lower court had entered judgment prior to
that date were allowed to press forward on appeal. See Review of Cases by the Supreme Court,
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat 662 (1988). The legislation thus had little effect on the plenary
docket in the 1988 Term, and affected only part ofthe 1989 Term. As a result, the new regime
was not fully in place until the 1990 Term.
100. More specifically, the Court heard 22 appeals in the 1984 Term, 30 appeals in the
1985 Term, 31 appeals in the 1986 Term, and 25 appeals in the 1987 Term. In counting, we
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In order to make the second part of the comparison, we reviewed every
plenary decision that the Court issued during each of the Terms from 19901993. In doing so, we applied the appeal criteria that were in place during the
1984-1987 Terms to determine which cases would have been before the Court
on appeal, had the now-repealed statutes still been in force.10 1 We also assumed that any litigant who would have been entitled to file an appeal would
have taken advantage of that route rather than petitioning for certiorari, because the Court granted plenary review more often in cases on appeal and was
obliged to provide at least some form of review on the merits in such cases."
treated consolidated cases as single appeals, regardless of how many individual cases they
included. Further, following the Supreme Court's own practice, we counted all cases that
received oral argument and resulted in either a signed opinion or a per curiam opinion. See,
e.g., Statement Showing the Number of CasesFiled,Disposedof andRemaining on Dockets
atConclusion ofOctober Terms, 1994, 1995 and 1996,521 U.S. 1154 (1997).
101. In making this determination, we relied'primarily on the Supreme Court's own description of how the case reached the Court. In addition, we used the standards that governed
from 1984-1987. Thus, for example, in judging whether the finality requirement was met, we
used the more flexible standards of that era, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
476-86 (1975) (discussing principles of finality); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 47-50
(1987) (same), rather than the more rigid regime in place today, see Jefferson v. City of Tarrant,
522 U.S. 75, 80-84 (1997) (limiting holding of CoxBroadcastingand Ritchie).
102. Section 1254(2), which authorized appeals in cases where a federal court of appeals
invalidated a state statute on constitutional grounds, permitted review only of the federal questions presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2) (repealed 1988). Thus, a litigant might choose to
petition for certiorari rather than to file an appeal if it wanted the Court to review unrelated
issues as well. Nevertheless, even in this situation, a prudent litigant would likely appeal so as
not to "diminish the chance of securing review of [the appealable] issue." STERN & GRESSMAN,
SIXTH EDMON, supra note 95, at 56.
Our proxy figure for the number of imputed "appeals" in the second period is likely to be
inaccurate only in two minor respects, which tend to offset one another. Our assumption that
any litigant that could have appealed would have done so may inflate this number to some
extent, as it is likely that not all litigants would have made this choice (for rational or irrational
reasons). Cutting in the other direction, however, is the effect ofthe repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 1252.
That provision had authorized a direct appeal from any federal court judgment that invalidated
an Act of Congress. The great majority of cases that received plenary consideration under this
provision were from the district courts. (In the four Terms from 1984-1987, 18 of the 24
appeals under this provision were from the district courts.) With the repeal of this provision,
such cases must now be vetted through the courts of appeals. See supra note 78 (discussing this
change). In our review of the 1990-1993 Terms, we counted every case in which either a
district court or a circuit court struck down a federal statute (there were 9 such cases; in 3 both
the district and circuit courts struck down the statute, in 5 only the circuit court did, and in 1
only the district court did). It is likely that the Supreme Court would have granted plenary
review in additional cases under the old regime because a district court had invalidated a federal
statute, but did not need to address the issue in the new regime because the decision had been
reversed by the court of appeals. This likelihood is borne out by the numbers, which show that
the decline in this category was almost twice as steep as the overall decline in appeals (the
decline of § 1252 cases was from 24 to 9, or 62%, while the overall decline was from 108 to 70,
or35%).

THE SUPREME COURT'SPLENARYDOCKET
Withinthese parameters, we determined that duringthe four Terms from 19901993, the Court granted plenary review in 70 such cases. 0 3
A straight comparison of the raw numbers suggests that there was a
noticeable decline in appeal-type cases: 108 appeals in the four-year period
prior to the 1988 legislation versus 70 "would-have-been" appeals in the fouryear period immediately following the legislation, an average of almost 10
fewer cases per year. However, as a percentage of the entire plenary docket
during the designated periods, the decline was insignificant. In the 1984-1987
period, the Court issued 609 plenary decisions.!0 4 The 108 appeals constituted
17.7% of the docket. In the 1990-1993 period, the Court issued 427 plenary
decisions.'0 5 The 70 imputed "appeals" constituted 16.4% of the docket. The
reduction in these cases as compared to the remainder of the Court's discretionary docket was thus quite modest, amounting to only one or two cases per
o
Term.l 0
Because the decline in the number of appeal-type cases virtually mirrored
the decline in the number of traditional certiorari cases, there are two possible
ways to explain how curbing the Court's mandatory jurisdiction affected the
docket. One possibility is that the Court did exercise its new discretion to cut
back significantly on "appeal" cases that were not worthy of certiorari review
(at the rate of ten or more per Term), but otherwise continued to take such
cases at the same rate that it had in the mid-1980s. Atthe same time, however,
some independent variable was driving down the number of traditional certiorari cases granted plenary review, without affecting the "appeal" cases.
Although this first explanation cannot be ruled out entirely, it is implausible. Far more likely is the possibility that some variable (or variables) independent of the legislative amendments was simultaneously depressing the
number of cases granted plenary review in both the traditional certiorari and
103. More specifically, the Court heard 10 cases that would have been appeals in the 1990
Term, 25 such cases in the 1991 Term, 12 such cases in the 1992 Term, and 23 such cases in
the 1993 Term. As with the 1984-1987 period, we treated consolidated cases as single appeals,
and we counted all cases that received oral argument and led to either a signed opinion or a per
curiam opinion. In addition, we treated cases with even one appealable issue as appeals,
assuming that the litigant would have chosen the more definite route of appeal over the less
definite route of certiorari. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining basis for this
assumption). We also, of course, included plenary appeals brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1253, which was unchanged by the 1988 legislation, in the count for both four-year periods.
104. SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7.
105. Id.
106. These results are not called into question by the fact that the percentage of appeals that
received plenary consideration regularly exceeded the percentage of petitions for certiorari that
were given similar treatment, see FREUND REPORT, supranote 1, at 580, because the statutory
criteria for mandatory appeals narrowed the band of potential cases to those which were more
likely to meet the Court's criteria for granting discretionary review. See PALMER, supra note 57,
at 77-78 (discussing similarities and differences between appeals and certiorari petitions).
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"appeal" categories, to approximately the same degree."° This strongly suggests that in the mid-1980s the Court was not giving plenary consideration to
appeals that did not warrant certiorari review, except in perhaps one or two
cases per Term, because it had already implemented internal procedures that
led it to evaluate appeals and petitions for certiorari in shnilar fashion when
deciding whether to grant review on the merits.1es The 1988 legislative
changes thus seem to have had little or no effect on the Court's plenary docket.
B. FewerActions Filed in ParticularSubject Areas
Justice Souter has suggested that the declining docket may be partly
attributable to fewer cases being filed in particular subject areas that are highly
susceptible to Supreme Court review, such as antitrust and civil rights."° Yet
a careful examination of the actual case filings reveals that this theory cannot
account for the decline.
At first blush, it seems unlikely that filings would have fallen in any
subject area, given that the total number of applications for review continued
its relentless climb from 4,413 inthe 1985 Termto 6,597 inthe 1995 Tenn.'
Nonetheless, most of this growth occurred in the in forma pauperis cases,
which are granted at a much lower rate, while the number of "paid" cases
remained relatively constant."' It is certainly possible, therefore, that the
107. It is possible, of course, that the virtual repeal of the Court's mandatory jurisdiction
could explainpart of the decline in the number of appeal-type cases granted review, while other

factors may have had a somewhat greater effect on reducing the number of traditional certiorari
cases granted review. Again, however, this seems unlikely. Indeed, the two most persuasive
explanations for the shrinking plenary docket, as we will see, are the declining number of civil
cases involving government parties, see infra Parts II.C & ILD, and changes in personnel on the
Supreme Court itself, see infra Part IlE. One would expect the former development, however,

to have just the opposite effect - Le., it would tend disproportionately to depress the number of
appeal-type cases, particularly those brought under the bulk of the Court's previous statutory
authority (under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1252, 1254(2), 1257(1), & 1257(2)). The latter development
seems likely to be simply neutral as between the two categories of cases.
108. It is rather surprising that the Justices themselves would have so greatly overestimated
the effect of the appeals on their docket, as one would expect that, through their repetitive
handling of thousands of cases, they would have developed a solid sense of whether they treat
mandatory appeals differently from petitions for certiorari in deciding whether to grant plenary
review. Yet even the occasional marginal appeal that was given full briefing and argument may

have acted as enough of an irritant to skew their view of the matter, and the complex, tedious,
and time-consuming process of determining whether cases fell within the mandatory appeal

provisions may have contributed as well. Moreover, as Professor Hellman noted, experience
shows that "the Justices do not always have an accurate picture of the Court's practices." Hellman,supra note 6, at 404.

109.
110.
111.

See Duffy, supranote 34, at 11 (quoting Justice Souter).
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, upranote 3, at 75 tbl. 2-2.
Id. at 82-83 tbl. 2-6.
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composition of the latter applications may have changed, and thus that fewer

cases are being filed in particular areas.
To evaluatethis proposed explanation, itis useful firstto consider whether
any substantive shift has occurred in the mix of cases that the Court has
decided on the merits. If fewer cases are being filed in certain areas, and this
fact is causing the overall docket to shrink, then the number of plenary deci-

sions in these areas should exhibit a corresponding decline." 2

Comparison of the 1983-1985 Terms to the 1993-1995 Terms indicates
that the number of plenary decisions in almost all of the major substantive
areas declined even more precipitously than the overall docket.' 3 The categories that declined the most, in terms oftotal plenary decisions, were civil rights
cases, administrative appeals, and search-and-seizure challenges. 4 Other
categories that declined significantly were civil eases raising procedural issues,
criminal due process cases, capital sentencing cases, criminal right-to-counsel
cases, federal tax cases, and antitrust cases.' 15 Over this period, the only major
area that6bucked the trend and held its firm grip on the docket was freedom of

speech."

112. Data on decided cases is more readily available than data on cases filed. For example,
in its annual recap of the Supreme Court Terms, the HarvardLaw Review compiles statistics
on the decided cases by issue area. See, e.g., The Supreme Cour4 1967 Term - The Statistics,
82 HARV. L. REV. 93, 301-02, 313-16 (1968) (explaining basis for calculating statistics).
Beginning with the 1955 Term, these statistics included a breakdown of the Court's disposition
of cases filed on the appellate docket (i.e., the "paid" cases) by issue area, but this practice was
discontinued after the 1967 Term. See, e.g., id. at 308-09 (Table IV). The HarvardLaw
Review publishes these statistics in the first issue of each volume; Volumes 82-114 include the
statistics for the 1967-1999 Terms, respectively, and will be cited collectively hereinafter as
"Supreme CourtStatistics."
113. The total docket fell from 473 plenary decisions in the 1983-1985 Terms to 252 in
the 1993-1995 Terms, a decline of 47%. SUIREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 85
tbl. 2-7. The HarvardLaw Review breaks down the decided cases into dozens of "issue" categories, but fewer than a dozen are "major" categories that consistently contribute any sizeable
number of eases to the Court's plenary docket See Supreme Court Statistics,supra note 112.
114. Fromthe 1983-1985 Terms to the 1993-1995 Terms, thetotal number ofplenary decisions in each category declined as follows: civil rights cases (56 to 22); administrative appeals
(49 to 21); search-and-seizure challenges (25 to 5). Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112.
"Civil rights cases" include cases raising voting rights and equal protection issues as well as
cases that the HarvardLaw Review identifies as raising civil rights issues. Id.
115. Over the same period, the decline in each category was as follows: civil cases raising
procedural issues (20 to 4); criminal due process cases (17 to 3); capital sentencing cases (13
to 3); criminal right-to-counsel cases (13 to 3); federal tax cases (12 to 5); antitrust cases (11
to 1). Id. For our purposes here, criminal cases include habeas cases.
116. There were 17 such cases decided from 1983-1985, and 16 from 1993-1995. Id.
Other minor substantive areas, each of which contributes few cases to the plenary docket and
which in the aggregate declined much less steeply than the rest of the plenary docket, do not
warrant closer examination here.

58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 737 (2001)
These figures are troublesome for the hypothesis: they suggest that if
fewer cases filed inparticular subject areas is the explanation forthe shrinking
docket, then this has happened on a grand scale, across diverse subjects on the
criminal side as well as the civil side ofthe Court's docket."1 Indeed, the point
can be readily tested in one of these areas because the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts records the number of applications for Supreme
Court review filed in administrative appeals. In fact, this number did not
decline over the same period; instead, it increased from 83 applications in the
1986 Term to 131 in the 1994 Term.11 8 The upshot, at least with respect to
administrative appeals, is that the Court simply decided to grant plenary review
less frequently in the later period than it did inthe earlier period.
The four areas involving issues of criminal law also do not appear to
conform to the "fewer cases filed" hypothesis. To begin with, the number of
applications for plenary review filed in federal criminal cases nearly tripled
over this period, 9 and it is implausible that this increase was offset by any
corresponding decline in state criminal cases. As there is no reason to think
that litigants in this new influx of criminal cases suddenly stopped raising
bread-and-butter complaints about improper searches and seizures, deprivation
of due process rights, and violation of the right to counsel, the 'suggested
hypothesis simply has no traction in these categories.
Although many of the criminal cases were informapauperisfilings, and
the Court grants these at a much lower rate,1 20 the informa pauperis cases
were largely exempt from the overall decline in the plenary docket: the Court
granted 47 such cases in the 1983-1985 Terms, and 44 such cases in the 1993117. Another measure is provided by the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, which
groups the Court's plenary decisions in thirteen general categories by subject area. It indicates
that the percentage of the docket falling within each of the specified areas has remained relatively
constant over the same period, which would mean that the docket has tended to shrink in a fairly
uniform manner across the board, except that some shift may have occurred away from cases
devoted to civil rights and due process guarantees toward economic litigation and cases involving judicial authority. See SUPREME COURT COMENDIUM, supranote 3, at 88-93 tbl. 2-9.
118. 1995 ANNUALREPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFCE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 95 tbl. B-2 [hereinafter
TRATIVE OFFICE
1995 JUDICIALBUSINESS]; 1987ANNuALREPoRT OF THE DIECTOR,ADMO]
OF THE UNITrED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNiTED STATES COURTS 146 tbl.
B-2 [hereinafter 1987 JUDICIAL BUSINESS]. The figures are kept by fiscal years, which happen
virtually to coincide with the Supreme Court's Terms. Unfortunately, the data in this table contains no detailed categories of cases other than U.S. civil, private civil, criminal, and administrative appeals, and does not include cases from the state courts. See 1995 JUDICIAL BUSINESS,
supra,at 95 tbl. B-2.
119. This figure increased from 633 in the 1986 Term to 2,162 in the 1994 Term. See
1995 JUDICIALBUSINESS, supra note 118, at 95 tbl. B-2; 1987 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supranote
118, at 146 tbl. B-2.
120. SuPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 82-83 tbl. 2-6.
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1995 Terms.' 2 ' Since the vast majority of informapauperiscases are criminal or habeas cases, the substantial growth in these filings - from 2,082 in the
1984 Termto 4,979 inthe 1994 Term'- likely precludes any possibility that
fewer meritorious issues are being raised in each of the four criminal categories."z Indeed, in capital sentencing cases, in particular, informa pauperis
cases have always constituted a large portion ofthe plenary docket; during the
1983-1985 Terms and the 1993-1995 Terms, for example, most plenary
decisions in capital sentencing cases were of this type.124
It is possible, however, that fewer cases were filed in the remaining
subject areas on the civil side, and thus this factor may play some part in the
docket's decline. The only way to evaluate this possibility is to categorize and
count the individual filings. We have done so by counting the cases filed on
the appellate docket in each of these categories - civil rights, civil procedure,
antitrust, and federal tax - for the 1983-1985 Terms and for the 1993-1995
Terms.
The resulting figures show that this theory does little to explain the
contraction in the plenary docket.126 In civil rights cases, which made up the
121. Id.
122. Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112.
123. Moreover, the number of "recommendations received" by the Solicitor General - that
is, the number of requests for authorization to take an appeal to either a circuit court or the
Supreme Court - in federal criminal eases also rose over roughly the same period from 693 in
the 1987 Term to 946 in the 1994 Term. These figures are taken from the "OSO[Office of the
Solicitor General] Workload Report," as compiled through June 24, 1999, at page 7 [hereinafter
OSO Workload Report]. The category of "recommendations received" is described more fully
in the text accompanying infra note 156.
124. More specifically, 8 of the 13 plenary decisions that were categorized as raising "capital sentencing" issues during the 1983-1985 Terms were informa pauperiscases, as were all
3 of these cases during the 1993-1995 Terms. Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112. Also,
in each of the other criminal categories, the in fomna pauperis filings contribute a regular
sprinkling of cases to the plenary docket Id.
125. As explained earlier, the HarvardLaw Review compiled these figures annually from
the 1955 Term through the 1967 Term. See supra note 112. The calculations were based on
the case summaries presented in United States Law Week, and our tabulations were made the
same way. Because UnitedStatesLaw Week provides summaries only for cases on the appellate
docket (the "paid" cases), and not for those on the miscellaneous docket (the informa pauperis
cases), we only considered the former. These figures should be a fair reflection of the whole,
however, since the vast majority of the informapauperisfilings are made in criminal or habeas
cases, and our count of the 1983-1985 and 1993-1995 Terms shows that the Court grants fewer
than one such application per Term in civil cases.
126. We counted all cases in which United States Law Week characterized antitrust and
(federal) taxation as the primary issue. We defined "civil procedure" cases to comprise all cases
identified in the case summaries as involving issues of "Courts and Procedure," "Arbitration,"
and "Judgments," and we included cases involving issues of "Judges" if they focused on procedural issues affecting particular cases. We defined "civil rights" cases to comprise all cases
identified in the case summaries as involving issues of "Civil Rights" and "Employment Dis-
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largest group of filings, the number ofpaid filings actually increasedover this
period. 7 In the areas of federal tax, civil procedure, and antitrust, there was
some decline in the number of cases filed, but nowhere near the decline that
occurred in the number of cases that were granted."2 These figures thus
suggest that the evolving interests of the Justices themselves caused more
changes in the substantive mix of cases on the plenary docket than the availability of various cases for review.
It remains possible, of course, that petitioners filed fewer meritorious
applications for review in recent years, as litigation continues in certain areas
without generating the kinds of significant "agenda" cases that lend themselves most naturally to Supreme Court review. Yet even here, the Court is
demonstrably more likely to grant review in cases in which amicus briefs are
filed at the petitioning stage, presumably because they indicate the general
importance of the issue raised.' As the number of cases in which amici filed
such briefs has increased in recent years, 3 ' this fact tends to cut against the
notion that fewer important cases are now making their way to the Court than
in previous years.
It is worth noting, however, that the statistics available on the Court's
plenary docket also disaggregate the Court's plenary decisions by party litigants and by whether the cases originated in state or federal court."
The
figures suggest that the docket has shrunk unevenly in these respects. As the
overall docket declined over the decade fromthe 1983-1985 Terms to the 19931995 Terms, for example, civil cases fromthe federal courts dropped in roughly
the same proportion, whereas civil cases from the state courts dropped very
little.1 32 Criminal cases from the state courts and federal habeas cases dropped
crimination," unless they raised First Amendment claims. In addition, we included cases categorized as "United States," "States," "Cities and Counties," "Schools and Colleges," "Prisons
and Jails," and "Constitutional Law" if they focused primarily on civil rights issues, including
due process and equal protection claims, but excluding First Amendment claims.
127. By our count, filings in civil rights cases rose from 723 in the 1983-1985 Terms to

847 in the 1993-1995 Terms.
128.

By our count,applications in federal tax cases fell from 161 in the 1983-1985 Terms

to 146 in the 1993-1995 Terms, whereas cases granted fell from 12 to 5. Filings in civil
procedure cases fell from 596 to 572, whereas cases granted fell from 20 to 4. Antitrust filings
dropped off more steeply, from 177 to 79 over the same period, but cases granted fell far more,
from 11 to 1.
129. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeim & John R. Wright, OrganizedInterests andAgenda
Setting in the U.S. SupremeCourt,82 AM POL. SCL REV. 1109,1115-22 (1988) (demonstrating
this correlation); Stephen M. Shapiro, Amicus Briefs in the Supreme Court, 10 LrIIG. 21, 24
(Spring 1984) (same).
130. See, e.g., STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 27, at 378-79, 564 (noting this increase).
131. See Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112.
132. Id.
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even more sharply than the overall docket, while criminal cases from the
federal courts declined much more gradually. 33 Within the category of federal
civil cases, cases involving the United States declined at about the overall rate,
whereas cases involving state and local governments declined more rapidly,
and cases involving private parties declined little." This shift inthe mix ofthe
decided cases raises important issues - distinct from those raised by Justice
Souter's observation - that will be examined inthe following sections.
C. FederalGovernment Seeking Review Less Frequently
A factor that is contributing to the declining docket is the smaller number
of cases in which the Solicitor General has been seeking plenary review on behalf of the United States.13 The Solicitor General is by far the most frequent
Supreme Court litigant and the most successful applicant in obtaining plenary
review. Indeed, the proportion of the Solicitor General's petitions for certiorari that the Court grants is consistently over fifty percent, whereas paid peti136
tions filed by other parties are granted at a rate of only about three percent.
The Solicitor General enjoys a special status as a party seeking plenary
review for several reasons. First, decisional conflicts are least tolerable when
they require the unitary federal government to operate differently, and to
dispense different brands ofjustice, in distinct parts ofthe country. 3 7 Second,
the key "importance" criterion for granting review on the merits is met, almost
ipse dixit, when the federal government asserts that it is directly and substantially affected by the outcome or reasoning of a lower court decision, particularly since the Solicitor General's office is understood to exercise its own
rigorous "screening function" with respect to potential cases.138 Third, the
quality of the work done by the Office of the Solicitor General is generally
superior to that of almost all other litigants. 139 For these reasons, the Supreme
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Hellman, supranote 6, at 417-19 (analyzing this trend).
136. See STERN & GRESSMAN, supranote 27, at 164 & n.6 (noting this difference); see also
REBEcCAMAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: TE PoLrrics oF LAw 25 (1992) (noting
that between 1959 and 1989, Solicitor General was successful in obtaining plenary review
69.78% of time, whereas private litigants were successful only 4.9% of time).
137. See Sup. CT. R. 10 (stating Court's criteria for granting certiorari).
138. See STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 27, at 164 (remarking that Solicitor General's
success "is due both to the fact that government cases are likely to be of more general public
importance and to the strictness with which the office screens the cases lost by the government
below before deciding to petition for certiorari" by "apply[ing] the Supreme Court's own certiorari standards").
139. See, e.g.,RICHARDA.PoSNER,THEFEDERALCOURTS: CHAILENGEANDREFORM 142
(1996) (describing Solicitor General's office as "superbly staffed"); SALOKAR, supra note 136,
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Court has developed a unique confidence in its most ubiquitous litigant.
Indeed, by tradition, the Solicitor General has come to be regarded as a "Tenth
Justice," straddling the gulf between the executive branch and the judicial
branch and bearing a keen sense of responsibility toward both. 4
Statistics from the Office of the Solicitor General demonstrate that the
United States has been seeking plenary review in fewer cases in recent years.
During the four Terms from 1984-1987, for example, the Solicitor General
sought review in 213 cases by filing either a petition for certiorari or a jurisdictional statement - an average of more than 53 cases per Term.14' In the
next four Terms, however, that number slipped to 137 cases - an average of
only about 34 per Term. 4 2 Since that time, the number has remained at this
lower level, falling further to 31 cases per Term from 1995-1998.43 The
figures suggest that the decline in requests by the Solicitor General has led to
a decline in plenary decisions, since the rate at which these requests are
granted remains much higher than for all other parties seeking review." In
addition, the number of cases in Which the Solicitor General filed amicus
briefs at the petition stage has also declined from an average of 37 cases per
Term from 1984-1991 to only 19 cases per Term from 1992-1999.141
The Solicitor General's pullback in seeking review accounts for a drop
of approximately 15 cases per Term in the Court's plenary docket." In addition, the Solicitor General's less active involvement as amicus at the certiorari
stage explains the loss of about 10 more cases per Term 47 because the federal
government is just about as successful in supporting another party's applicaat 33-34 (noting that Solicitor General's office contains "some of the best attorneys in our
nation").
140. See iNcoLNCALAN, THE TmEnHJUsTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENBRALAND TE RULE
OF LAW (1987) (discussing role and importance of Solicitor General in work performed by
Supreme Court).
141.
The actual numbers were: 1984 Term- 51; 1985 Term- 57; 1986 Term- 56; 1987
Term- 49. OSG Workload Report, supranote 123, at 1.
142. These additional numbers were: 1988 Term -37; 1989 Term -30; 1990 Term - 35;
1991 Term-35. Id.
143.
Thenumbers forthemostrecent Termswere: 1992 Term-38; 1993 Term-33; 1994
Term-28; 1995 Term-41; 1996 Term- 30; 1997 Term-21; 1998 Term- 32. Id.
144. Actual percentages can be derived from the same source by taking the total number
of cases in which the Court granted plenary review and dividing it by the number of applications
filed, with some adjustment for cases in which the Court disposed of an application by vacating
and remanding for further proceedings. The results indicate a slight but noticeable decline in
the Solicitor General's success rate in petitioning for review over the past decade. Id
145. Id. at 3.
146. Calculating the averages over five Terms, the decline in the number of cases set for
plenary review at the request of the Solicitor General has been from 28 per Term (1985-1989
Terms) to 14 per Term (1994-1998 Terms). Id. at 1.
147. Id. at3.
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tion for review as it is in seeking review in its own right.'48 These figures
indicate that the drop in filings by the Solicitor General, which occurred over
essentially the same period as the decline in the plenary docket, is an independent factor that made a substantial contribution to the decline. 49
But this fact prompts an even more interesting question: What has caused
this decline in the Solicitor General's activity? Three hypotheses, which are
not mutually exclusive, warrant examination. First, the Justice Department
may have changed its internal petitioning policies or criteria, and as a result
may be seeking review in a smaller percentage of cases. Second, the Justice
Department may be applying the same criteria, butthe federal government may
be involved in less litigation than in the past. Third, the Justice Department
may be applying the same criteria to fewer cases simply because the federal
government is winning more of its cases in the lower courts."'

There is no indication that the Justice Department has changed its internal
petitioning policies or criteria in the last decade."' The bulk ofthe recommendations concerning whether to seek Supreme Court review have always been
made by attorneys inthe agencies and in the rest ofthe Justice Department who
are career officials and by a small group of assistants in the Solicitor General's
office who are generally nonpartisan, highly qualified appellate lawyers, and
much ofthe caseload itself is low profile and apolitical in nature. 2 Even more
to the point, the decline in requests for Supreme Court review has occurred
during a period that spans administrations of both political parties and the
tenures of multiple occupants in the top departmental positions. 3
148. In fact, Professor Salokar's exhaustive statistical data indicates that from 1959 to
1989, the Solicitor General enjoyed an even higher success rate in obtaining review as an
amicus (87.6%) than as a party (69.8%). See SALOKAR, supra note 136, at 25, 27 (noting
success rate as party and as amicus, respectively). In past years, the Solicitor General typically
endorsed this same assumption by including "cases supported" with "cases filed" in statistics
on the federal government's performance in obtaining plenary review from the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., 1972 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 26 (reporting work of Solicitor General's Office).
149. In this respect,it is interesting to note that when the plenary docket fell sharply during
the Vinson Court era, no such drop in the number of applications for review filed by the Solicitor General occurred, though the rate at which those applications were successful declined
noticeably. See 1955 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 28-29 (providing statistics).
150. Professor Heilman also briefly discusses possible causes of the reduction in the
number of applications filed by the Solicitor General, touching on the first and third hypotheses,
but does not draw any conclusions about them. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 418.
151.
See, e.g., SALOKAR, supranote 136, at 63 (noting that the "well-structured process for
handling the cases that flow through the office ....
has changed very little over time despite the
different management styles of the various solicitors general"); Marcus, supra note 35, at A4
(quoting Solicitor General Starr's statement that "'[tlhere's no difference in our standards' for
deciding when to seek review").
152. See SALOKAR, supranote 136, at 63-67,77-79 (describing Solicitor General's Office).
153. See id. at 67 ("[T]here was no dramatic change in the functioning of the office when
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To evaluate whether the Solicitor General's office has tightened its standards for seeking review, and thus whether it is doing so in a smaller percentage
of cases, it would help to compare, over time, the number of cases in which the
Solicitor General's office sought review against the total number of cases in
which it might have done so. Although that total number is not available, the
statistics compiled currently by the Office of the Solicitor General provide a
proxy." Bylaw, the federal government cannot appeal an adverse decision by
a district court or a circuit court without the approval of the Solicitor
General.' 5 The category of "recommendations received" lumps together all

such requests for authorization to take an appeal." 6 Assuming thatthe proportion of recommendations received from adverse district court rulings and

adverse circuit court rulings remains constant over time - which seems reason-

able, though not inevitable

7-

then plotting the number of cases in which the

federal government sought plenary review against the number ofrecommendations received will yield a rough sense of whether the Solicitor General has
been seeking review in a smaller percentage of the cases that are available. 5 8
The resulting numbers suggest that the Solicitor General has not become
more stingy in seeking Supreme Court review. Over the decade from 1987 to
one administration departed and another arrived."). Professor Helman mentions that some
Senators had questioned the zeal of Solicitor General Drew Days in criminal cases. HeIlman,
supra note 6, at 418. As shown below, however, both the number and rate of cases filed by the
Solicitor General in criminal cases has remained stable over the past decade. See infra notes
171-72 and accompanying text.
154. For many years the Solicitor General reported these statistics annually and they were
published as part of the Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States. The
numbers available from the 1936 Term to the 1984 Term indicate that since the mid-1950s a period of three decades spanning numerous Solicitors General, administrations of both parties,
and extensive changes on the Supreme Court - the Solicitor General has authorized applications
for plenary review at a relatively constant rate of about 7-11% of all recommendations received,
computed in three-Term rolling averages to smooth out fluctuations. See, e.g., 1985 Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 5 (reporting number of cases acted upon by Solicitor General's Office); 1984 Att'y
Gen. Ann. Rep. 5 (same), 1983 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 5 (same).
155. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2000) (prescribing functions of Solicitor General's Office).
156. Unfortunately, the figures no longer isolate the number of recommendations received
for seeking Supreme Court review, which is the only number that matters here. See OS
Workload Report, supra note 123, at 7.
157. The more complete statistics provided in the Annual Reports of the Attorney General
prior to 1985, which did isolate recommendations received in potential circuit court cases from
those received in potential Supreme Court cases, support the hypothesized correlation. See,
e.g., 1985 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 5 (providing these statistics); 1975 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 37-38

(same).
158. Natural time lags mean that some of the recommendations received in a given Term
would not generate applications for plenary review in the same Term. Because the point here
is to discern trends, however, it is plausible to assume that any such adjustments should remain
constant over time, especially when three-year averages are used to smooth out the fluctuations.
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1998, the three-Term averages indicate that the Solicitor General sought

review in virtually the same percentage of the available cases throughout this
period.159 When the total number of cases is broken down into civil and
criminal cases, the same relative consistency appears in both categories." 6 In
sum, what has declined is the number of cases available, not the Solicitor
General's propensity to seek review in a given case.
This assessment is bolstered by the fact that over this period, even though
the Solicitor General's overall caseload declined along with the Court's own

shrinking docket, 61 the Solicitor General participated on the merits in a higher

percentage ofthe Supreme Court's cases. During the five Terms from 1984-

1988, at a time whenthe Court carried a much larger docket, the United States
participated in approximately 60% of the cases that received plenary
review.

62

During the most recent five Terms for which statistics are avail-

able, from 1994-1998, by contrast, the United States participated in about 75%
of such cases - the highest participation rate in the las fifty years. 6 3 This

development reflects both the pressures and the opportunities of applying the
same amount of staff resources to a smaller universe of cases." But it also
strongly suggests that there has been no determined withdrawal of the Solicitor General's office from the day-to-day work done by the Supreme Court. 65
159.
The proxy figure ranges from a low of 1.36% to a high of 1.73% over this period, with
no apparent chronological pattern.
160. The proxy figure for criminal cases ranges from 0.70% to 0.97% over this period, and
the same figure for civil cases ranges from 1.88% to 2.19%, with no clear trend line in either
instance. It is noteworthy, moreover, that these proxy figures are basically consistent with the
figures actually available from the Solicitor General's annual reports on earlier Terms, which
are discussed supra in note 154.
161.
The Solicitor General participated in 91 cases decided on the merits in the 1988 Term,
and in 76 such cases in the 1998 Term. OSG Workload Report, supra note 123, at 8.
162. See id. The percentage figures are derived from the number of "No Participation"
cases and the total number of decisions during a Term. These figures are comparable to those
generated by a broader survey of the Solicitor General's involvement in plenary decisions over
the period from 1959 to 1989. See SALOKAR, supra note 136, at 22 tbl. I (calculating that
United States participated in 58.8% of all cases argued in Supreme Court from 1959-1989).
163. OSG Workload Report, supra note 123, at 8. Up until 1986, the participation rate
could be determined from figures provided in the Attorney General's Annual Reports. See, e.g.,
1985 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 5 (tabulating cases in which government participated); 1963 Att'y
Gen. Ann. Rep. 53 (same).
164.
The participation rate in recent Terms is higher than it was after the plenary docket
declined under the Vinson Court: in the 1950-1954 Terms, the Solicitor General participated
in 61% of the argued cases. See 1955 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 31 (noting rate of participation in
each Term).
165.
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the number of federal civil cases on the
Supreme Court's plenary docket involving a state or local government declined even more
steeply than U.S. civil cases between the 1983-1985 Terms and the 1993-1995 Terms. See
Supreme Court Statisfics, supra note 112.
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A second possible explanation for the decline in the Solicitor General's
applications for review is simply that the federal government is involved in
less litigation.'66 The data that is available suggests that this is a contributing
factor, at least with regard to civil cases.
From the 1984 Term to the 1994 Term, the federal government's involvement in new civil cases in the district courts, whether as plaintiff or defendant,
was reduced by more than half' 67 Not surprisingly, over this same period
there was also a sharp drop in the number of the federal government's cases
decided after oral argument in the circuit courts,"e as well as in the number
of recommendations received by the Solicitor General.' This decline in the
federal government's civil litigation corresponds neatly with the decline in the
Solicitor General's applications for review of civil cases in the Supreme
Court, which fell by more than half over this period.Y0
The impact of the federal government's decreasing involvement in civil
litigation on the Solicitor General's activity is highlighted by the contrast with
the criminal side of the docket. During this period, the number of criminal
cases in the district and circuit courts rose, as did the number of recommendations received by the Solicitor General.' This trend is reflected in the Solici166. For our purposes, cases involving the federal government comprise all litigation in
which the parties include the United States, a federal department or agency, or a federal official.
167. In the 1984 Term, the civil cases filed in the district courts in which the federal government was a party totaled 117,488, with 79,371 as plaintiff and 38,117 as defendant. 1987
JLJDIcLALBUSIN SS, supra note 118, at 8 tbl. 4. In the 1994 Term, there were only 43,158 U.S.
civil cases, with 14,130 as plaintiff and 29,028 as defendant 1995 JUDICIALBUsIN ss, supra
note 118, at 23 tbl. 4.
168. The number of civil cases in which the federal government was a party that were
decided on the merits after oral argument (including administrative appeals) fell from 2,392 in
the 1986 Term to 1,982 in the 1994 Term, and has continued falling since to 1,728 in the 1998
Term. 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ADMINIsTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNIIED
STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BusmNss OF THE UNiTED STATES COURTS 85 tbL B-1 [hereinafter
1999 JUDICIAL BuSINss]; 1995 JUDICIAL BusINEss, supra note 118, at 87 tbl. B-2; 1987
JUDICIAL BUSIMSs, supra note 118, at 136 tbL B-1.
169. Recommendations received in civil cases fell from 1,532 in the 1987 Term to 1,183
in the 1993 Term, and stood at 1,084 for the 1998 Term. 1999 JUDIClALBusINESS,supra note
168, at 85 tbl. B-1; 1995 JUDICIAL BUSINESS, supra note 118, at 87 tbl. B-2; 1987 JUDICIAL
BUSINESS, supranote 118, at 136 tbl. B-1.
170. The three-Term average number of applications for review filed by the Solicitor General in civil cases declined from 46 to 21 between the 1984 and 1998 Terms, with most of the
drop occurring during three Terms in the late 1980s. OS Workload Report, supra note 123,
at 1.
171.
The number of federal criminal cases filed in the district courts more than doubled
over two decades, rising from 28,932 in 1980 to 59,923 in 1999. 1999 JUDICIAL BUSInESS,
supranote 168, at23 tbl. 3; 1987 JUDICIALBUSINESS,supra note 118, at 13 tbl. 5. Inthe circuit
courts, federal criminal cases decided after oral argument rose from 2,108 in the 1986 Term to
3,686 in the 1994 Term, before receding to 2,918 in the 1998 Term. 1999 JUDICIALBUSMNSS,
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tor General's applications for review in criminal cases, which did not decline,
but rather
held steady or perhaps increased slightly betweenthe 1984 and 1998
Terms. 172
In addition to the decreasing amount of civil litigation involving the federal government, a further factor contributing to the decline in the number of
the Solicitor General's applications for review may be that the federal govern-

ment is winning more of its civil cases in the lower courts.173 No numbers are

kept on the federal government's "winning percentage," in part because figures
on wins and losses in appellate cases are notoriously difficult to ascertain given multiple parties, multiple claims, and multiple perspectives on whether
a particular disposition constitutes a full or even a partial win.174 Yet one
sound indicator is the number of cases in which the opposing party seeks
review from the Supreme Court. In all such cases, the Solicitor General either
files or waives its response, and maintains these statistics for each Term.175 If
this figure is taken as a general proxy for the number of circuit court cases that
the federal government won, and "recommendations received" is taken as a
general proxy for the number of circuit court cases thatthe federal government
lost,176 then comparing the two figures over time will shed light on how the
supra note 168, at 85 tbl. B-I; 1995 JUDICIALBUSINEss, supra note 118, at 87 tbl. B-i; 1987
JUDICIAL BusINEss, supra note 118, at 138 tbl. B-1. In the Solicitor General's office, recommendations received in criminal cases rose from 693 during the 1987 Term to 1,113 in the 1993
Term, then declined to 870 in the 1998 Term. OSG Workload Report, supra note 123, at 7.
172. The five-Term average number of criminal cases filed by the Solicitor General was
about 8-9 per Term between the 1984 and 1998 Terms. See OS Workload Report, supra note
123, at 1. The Supreme Court's own docket also reflects the federal government's level of
litigation activity. The number of plenary decisions in civil cases involving the federal government, expressed as a five-Term average, fell steadily from 45 to 19 over the 1981-1996 Terms.
Supreme CourtStatistics, supra note 112. In contrast, the number of plenary decisions in
federal criminal cases, expressed as a five-Term average over the same period, ranged from 10.4
to 13.8, with no discernible trend line. Id.
173. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 35, at A4 ("'First of all, the government is not losing
nearly as many cases as it used to and therefore it's filing fewer petitions."') (quoting former
Deputy Solicitor General Andrew Frey).
174. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 418 (noting lack of data on "win-loss rate"). Interestingly, however, the Solicitor General did keep such statistics at one time, and as a general matter
they indicate that between 1937 and 1966 the federal government's winning percentage did vary
somewhat, ranging from approximately 46% to 61% for appeals that it initiated in the circuit
courts. See, e.g., 1940 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 48 (listing number of cases won); 1955 Att'y Gen.
Ann. Rep. 32 (same); 1966 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 54 (same). These figures are only part of the
total picture, however, for they do not include any cases in which the federal government was
the appellee in the circuit courts, which do not have to be processed through the Solicitor
General's office. See 1940 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 48 (noting this distinction).
175. OSG Workload Report, supranote 123, at 2, 6.
176. The basis for the latter proxy figure, which admittedly is nothing more than a very
general approximation, is discussed above. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text
(discussing impact of statistics that isolate recommendations).
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federal government is faring in such cases. The results of this comparison do
indicate that the federal government is winning more of its civil cases than it
was ten years ago." 7 Another indication that it is winning more of its cases is
that during a period in which the total amount ofthe federal government's civil
litigation was decreasing, the number of applications for review filed against
the federal government in the Supreme Court more than doubled."'
This seems plausible enough. Over the course of the last two decades,
there is no doubt that the ranks of the federal judiciary have become more
79
conservative and thus probably, on the whole, more "pro-government."0
Civil libertarians have recognized this development - which itself is an independent factor that discourages certain kinds of lawsuits against government
officials and government entities - and openly factor it into their constitutional litigation strategies when it is possible to do so."' Even in nonconstitutional cases, new judicial doctrines that explicitly favor the federal government's legal positions have been adopted and established as precedent."" In
this climate, it is to be expected that the federal government would begin to
177. The ratio of the two proxy figures - recommendations received to aggregated waivers
and responses filed in civil cases - has fallen from 3.28 in the 1987-1989 Terms to 2.64 in the
1996-1998 Terms. Again, this number has no objective meaning other than as an indicator of
the general trend. In order to define the universe of significant cases in a more meaningful way,
we did not include waivers filed in the informapauperiscivil cases.
178. The number of applications filed against the federal government in civil cases (including administrative appeals) increased from 391 in the 1986 Term to 863 in the 1996 Term, see
1987JUDICIALBUsINSS,supra note 118, at 146tbl. B-2; 1997ANNUALREPORTOFTHEDIRECTOR, ADINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF TH UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BuSINEss OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 85 tbl. B-2, even though the number of such applications filed by the
Solicitor General declined from 56 to 30 over the same period. 0S0 Workload Report, supra
note 123, at 1.
179. This is a necessarily crude observation, as some so-called "conservative" legal positions, such as hostility to broad congressional powers, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down provision of Violence Against Women Act); United States v.
Lopcz, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act), and favoring of state
power in disputes over federalism, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(declaring provision of Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act unconstitutional); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (declaring that "take title" provision in radioactive waste
disposal statute is unconstitutional), are antithetical to the interests of the federal government
Nonetheless, in the broad array of cases it is sound enough.
180. See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, Frustratedby Change in Federal Courts,A.C.LU. to
Concentrateon States,N.Y. TIMES, Sept 30, 1991, atAl (discussing changes in strategy based
on federal courts' antipathy); Robb London, Gay Groups Turn to State Courtsto Win Rights,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1990, at B3 (same).
181. Perhaps the most significant example in this regard is the now-settled principle of
"Chevron" deference, whereby the courts will defer to legal judgments made by federal administrative agencies exercising the authority delegated by Congress, see Chevron U.SAL Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), including positions taken by the Justice
Department itself, see Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998).
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prevail more often in the lower courts and, as a consequence, the Solicitor
General would have fewer occasions to seek plenary review. This, in turn,
would cause the Supreme Court to accept fewer cases, as the federal government's high success rate inseeking plenary review would be replaced by the
much lower success rate of all other parties." There is no doubt that this
explanation is responsible for as much as one-third of the total decline in the
Supreme Court's plenary docket."8 3
D. GreaterHomogeneity Among the Courts
Another suggested explanation, which we credit in part is greater homogeneity among the lower courts.'84 According to this theory, a broad judicial
realignment resulting from the steady appointment of like-minded federal
judges has contributed to the declining docket. Justice Souter describes this
homogeneity as one legacy of "the Reagan-Bush era," and he speculates that
it is a "rare" phenomenon that probably will be short-lived."l 5
Advocates of this view focus on the possibility that changes within the
lower courts have led them to agree more frequently with one another, which
we call a "philosophical realignment." This concept is related to but distinct
from what we call a "control realignment," which occurs when the Supreme
Court exerts greater control over the lower courts by providing clearer guidance that brings them more squarely in line with the direction of its own
decisions. If the Presidency, which is the source of all federal judicial appointments, were controlled by the same political party for an extended
period, both might occur eventually (at least in the federal system).' 8 6 Either
type of realignment would have clear repercussions for the Court's docket:
a philosophical realignment would reduce the need to grant review to resolve
decisional conflicts, and a control realignment would reduce the need to grant
review to correct perceived errors."n
182. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (describing respective success rates).
183.
This conclusion is based on a decline ofabout 20-25 cases per Term that stems directly
from the drop in filings by the Solicitor General, see supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text,
over a period in which the total plenary docket has fallen by about 70-75 cases per Term, see
supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. Professor Hellman likewise concludes that the
"reduction in the number of petitions filed by the Solicitor General does account for a substantial
part ofthe shrinkage of the plenary docket in the 1990s." Hellmansupra note 6, at418.
184. See, e.g., Hellman, supranote 6, at 414-17 (describing this theory); Duffy, supra note
34, at 11 (quoting Justice Souter suggesting this theory at Third Circuit Judicial Conference).
185. Duffy, supra note 34, at I I (quoting Justice Souter).
186. One should note that these theories of realignment are ideology-neutral, ie., they do
not depend on whether the supposed realignment occurs in a more "conservative" or a more
"liberal" direction.
187. There is, of course, great potential for overlap between these two effects, as a philosophical realignment that extended to the Supreme Court itself would also reduce perceived
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There are two empirical reasons to doubt the extent to which a philosophical realignment can explain the shrinking plenary docket."' 8 The first concerns timing. On the surface, the recent changes in the docket seem consistent
with this possibility, for the decline commenced in the later stages of prolonged one-party control of the Presidency, from 1981-1993, after the Republicans had made extensive appointments to the district courts and the circuit
courts. Yet if philosophical realignment per se tended to explain the falling
caseload, then one would expect the numbers to increase again after several
years of a Democratic President, and surely they would have done so by 2000,
after eight years of Democratic judicial appointments to the lower courts. In
fact, however, this has not happened.18 9
Second, a large number of decisional conflicts remain available for the
Supreme Courtto review. Inparticular, the "Circuit Split Roundup," a publication that describes those decisional conflicts which can be identified by examining the face of individual lower court opinions, identifies approximately 400
such acknowledged conflicts per year."r There appears to be no definitive way
to measure whether there are fewer decisional conflicts today than in past
years, or whether they may be of lesser significance than in the past. It is
certainly clear, however, that even if greater homogeneity among the lower
errors, and a control realignment that caused the lower courts to adhere more consistently to the
Supreme Court's philosophy as embodied in its precedents also would reduce the number of
conflicts.
188. There are also various conceptual reasons to be skeptical about the extent or breadth
of any philosophical realignment First, a complete realignment would have to include the state
courts as well because they are capable of spawning conflicts with each other and with the federal
courts on issues of federal law (though this factor would not affect cases involving the federal
government, which parties typically either file in or remove to the federal courts). Second, the
realignment would have to endure for some time because decisional conflicts can be
intertemporal in nature. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 414-15 (pointing out that circuit conflicts
can arise when, for example, panel with Reagan-Bush judges disagrees with earlier decision by
panel with Carterjudges). Third, the judges appointed would have to share ajudicial philosophy
that is clear and comprehensive enough to produce uniform results even in cases involving
intricate issues of statutory construction and procedure in such diverse areas as criminal law,
bankruptcy, administrative law, and the like. These concerns, however, do not mean that
philosophical realignment could not have had some effect in particular areas of the law.
189. Moreover, a similar decline should be discernible during the latter part of Franklin
Roosevelt's Presidency, when he had been appointing judges for more than a decade. As we
have seen, however, no such development occurred until President Truman made three appointments that dramatically shifted the philosophical balance on the Supreme Court. See supra
notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing voting patterns of Vimson Court).
190. This compilation has been published monthly, with some regularity, based on circuit
decisions rendered since January of 1998. See, e.g.,LegalNews-NotableNew Developments
in theLaw, CircuitSplitRoundup, 66 U.S.L.W. 2575 (Mar. 24,1998). The number of conflicts
identified was about 30 per month in 1998, rising to about 40 per month in 1999 and 2000, with
some slight redundancy as new decisions occasionally acknowledge the same unresolved conflicts. Id.
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courts has created some form of a philosophical realignment, plenty ofconflicts
remain. Atthe very least, lower courts continue to create many more decisional
conflicts each year than are being reconciled by the Supreme Court.'
Nonetheless, the discussion in Part C suggests that one particular form of
judicial realignment may have had a tangible effect on the Supreme Court's
docket. That is, an apparent realignment in the lower federal courts toward
more "pro-government" results - i.e., a "statist realignment" - has led the
Solicitor General to seek review less often in civil cases, with a corresponding
decline in such cases granted.'9 2 Once again, this realignment seems to have
made itself felt both by deterring lawsuits against the federal government and
by affording less opportunity for it to seek review of adverse decisions."rs
Consequently, the number of plenary decisions in civil cases involving the
federal government has sunk dramatically: it averaged 40 cases per Term from
1983-1985, but only 19 cases per Term from 1993-1995.1"4
A similar development is manifest in federal litigation that involves state
and local governments. Indeed, it is striking that the number of plenary decisions in federal civil cases involving state and local governments has fallen
even more steeply than in cases involving the federal government: from an
average of 35 cases per Term from 1983-1985 to fewer than 11 cases per Term
from 1993-1995.95 And it is interesting that the same pattern does not hold for
civil litigation involving state and local governments from the state courts: the
average number of plenary decisions in such cases per Term was 7 from 19831985 and was still 7 from 1993-1995.196 Although it is conceivable that the
191. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 414-17 (comparing number of "conflict grants" for
periods 1983-85 and 1993-95). Professor Hellman concluded that "the Supreme Court is taking
somewhat fewer conflict cases than it did in the 1980s, but that the reduction in conflict grants
accounts for only a small part of the overall shrinkage in the plenary docket" Id. at 416.
192. See supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text (discussing trend among federal judiciary towards "pro-government" decisions).
193. See supra notes 166-78 and accompanying text (discussing reduction in federal government's participation in litigation).
194. Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112.
195. Id. Over the same period, the numbers of petitions filed by state and local governments in civil cases also declined, though less sharply, from an average of 89 per Term to 78
per Term. We derived these figures from counting the cases filed on the appellate docket, based
on the case summaries presented in UnitedStates Law Week. See supra note 125. The consequences of the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which protects the states against
lawsuits in the federal courts, are probably at -workhere also. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997) (discussing both
historical and recent interpretations ofEleventh Amendment).
196. These figures are skewed somewhat by the fact that no such cases were decided during
the 1985 Term, yet the rolling three-Term averages range from 7 to 12 over this period, with no
obvious trend line. Supreme CourtStatistics,supranote 112. The Court's decisions construing
the Eleventh Amendment may also have an effect here by pushing more of these civil lawsuits
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state courts (which are not immune to the same political forces felt in the
federal courts) could have moved in the same pro-government direction as the
lower federal courts, these numbers at least suggest thatthe state courts did not
experience a statist realignment to nearly the same degree.1"
Outside the arena of government litigation, however, any theory of
realignment confronts mixed results. The decline in the number of plenary
decisions in private civil litigation has been much less pronounced, with
federal civil cases falling only from an average of 23 per Term in 1983-1985
to 19 in 1993-1995, and civil cases from the state courts falling only from 5
to 4 over the same periods.9' Although the matter is fairly speculative, one
might surmise that uniformity is harder to achieve in private civil cases, in
which the issues involved are more diverse and thus do not fall into clear and
consistent patterns. The resulting uncertainty in the Supreme Court's own
precedents would make it harder for the lower courts to discern its general
direction, and the extent of homogeneity within the lower courts themselves
would be reduced. Thus, the Court may have more occasion, and may feel
more of a need, to intervene and provide guidance in these categories of cases.
This statist realignment therefore does reflect an increased commonality
of approach among the judges on the lower federal courts in certain types of
cases. It is harder to pin down whether this result flows more from a shared
outlook of the Reagan-Bush nominees or from the lower courts' conformance
to a pro-government philosophy that-the Supreme Court has imposed onthem.
In practice, the effects of these influences are difficult to separate, and it
seems most likely that both have played an important part.
It should be noted, however, that a statist realignment in the lower federal
courts will cause fewer cases to come to the Supreme Court for review, and
thus fewer to be granted review, only if the Court itself is comfortable with
these pro-government results." If the Court is dissatisfied with this trend, it
into the state courts. See generally Joanne C. Brant, TheAscent ofSovereign Immunity, 83 IOWA
L. REV. 767 (1998) (discussing how recent Eleventh Amendment decisions forced actions to
enforce federal laws into state courts).
197. Professor Hellman analyzes the issue of greater "conservatism in the lower courts" by
focusing almost exclusively on state criminal cases and habeas cases, which leads him to
suggest that realignment in the lower federal courts has had little to do with the shrinking
docket See Hellman, supra note 6, at 419-25; see also infra note 201 (discussing interaction
between Supreme Court and lower courts). As we have seen, however, a larger portion of the
decline is attributable to changes that have occurred in federal civil cases, which is part of the
reason why we reach a contrary conclusion.
198. Supreme CourtStatistics,supra note 112. The number of private civil cases from the
state courts has fallen even more in the wake of Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75
(1997), which tightened the finality requirement for Supreme Court review of state decisions.
See id. at 80-84. This reduction has been offset, however, by an increase in private civil cases
from the federal courts. See Supreme Court Statistics,supra note 112.
199. Further, during a period of realignment on the Supreme Court itself, its internal strug-
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will exert its authority over the lower courts by granting more such cases,
which in turn will encourage litigants to seek plenary review in more such
cases. Thus a statist realignment can only succeed in depressing the Supreme
Court's plenary docket when it is conjoined with some version of a control
realignment - i.e., if it is in conformity with the Court's own prevailing
philosophy as expressed in its precedents. This seems to be an accurate
description of the current state of affirs, at least in cases in which government entities and officials are parties. 2' For three decades, the Court has been
gravitating in favor of government litigants, and the lower courts have surely
gotten the message by now."° This discussion of judicial realignment thus
gles may lead to more decisional conflicts in certain areas of the law, as the Court's changing
philosophy creates departures from precedent that are difficult to interpret and anticipate in the
lower courts. One plausible example is the uncertain contours of the much-anticipated judicial
"counter-revolution" during the Burger Court era, which may have contributed to the Supreme
Court's own higher caseload. See generally VINCENT BLASi, THE BURGER COURT: THE
CoUNTER-REVoLt oN THAT WASN'T (1983). This point, which merits further study, differs
from, but is compatible with, Professor O'Brien's argument that the Burger Court's "'workload
problem' was one of its own making." O'Brien, supra note 6, at 808; see also id. at 788-89
(discussing effects of Court's internal procedures and its composition).
200. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,
56-59, 61-74 (1989) (describing Court as having pro-government or statist orientation). It is
also possible, however, that a rise in the Court's caseload can occur after an internal realignment, as the Justices come to expect a majority of the Court to move in a predictable direction
and thus can "set an agenda" with some degree of confidence. An example is the recent upsurge
in cases that the Supreme Court has granted on federalism issues, reflecting the new majority
on the Court favoring state authority in such cases. See, e.g., 146 Cong. Rec. S7758-01 (daily
ed. July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (discussing "a growing trend of judicial secondguessing of congressional policy decisions" on grounds of federalism); Linda Greenhouse, High
CourtFacesMoment of Truth inFederalism Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, § 1, at 34
(opining that "flood of new [federalism] cases is the direct result of the Court's recent federalism initiatives").
The general ramifications of internal realignment for the Court's plenary docket would
also present a fruitful subject for further examination. The impetus for an increase in judicial
activity would be dissatisfaction either with lower court decisions or with the Court's own
precedents. The former impetus is exemplified by the Court's aggressive treatment of state
criminal decisions in the 1980s, which caused the number of plenary decisions in this area to
rise substantially - from an average of 13 per Term in 1979-1984 to 20 per Term in 1985-1990.
Supreme Court Statistics,supranote 112. The latter impetus has not been an abiding concern
in recent years; the number of cases in which the Court overruled its own precedents was lower
in the 1990s than in any decade since the 1950s. SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note
3, at 179-89 thl. 2-14. This data has been updated for subsequent Terms by personnel at the
U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, see infra note 227.
201. See, e.g., D.F.B. TUCKER, THE REENQUIsT COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS 211 (1995)
(concluding that current Court is "resolve[d] to abandon the conception of the role of the Court
as a legitimate policymaker"); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT 453 (1992) (concluding that "change in membership" has eliminated support for "the old agenda"). In the criminal area, with its control now presumably
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points to the need to consider how changes in the Supreme Court itself likely
affected the size and shape of its plenary docket.
E. Changes in Personnelon the Supreme Court
One of the most compelling explanations for the recent decline in the
Supreme Court's plenary docket stems directly from changes in personnel.
Recall that when a similar decline occurred fifty years ago, the primary cause
was the retirement of Justices who had voted aggressively to review cases and
their replacement by new Justices who were far less inclined to do so. 2" Two
facts about the figures demonstrate irrefutably that these personnel changes
were independent causes of the decline in the plenary docket in that era. First
is the immediate magnitude of the change in the numbers from the former
Justices to their replacements: in the 1950 Term, Justices Clark and Minton
cast only 103 and 69 grant votes, respectively, whereas in the 1948 Term
Justices Murphy and Rutledge had cast 186 and 143 such votes, respectively. 3 Second is the unique direction of the change in the numbers: in the
span comprising the 1949-1952 Terms, every holdover Justice voted to grant
review more frequently than he did in the 1946-1948 Terms, yet in the later
period Justices Clark and Minton cast an average of only 103 and 70 grant
votes per Term, respectively, whereas in the earlier period Justices Murphy
and Rutledge had cast an average of 181 and 159 such votes, respectively. 2 4
reestablished, the Court's preoccupation with correcting lower court rulings has abated, as the
number of plenary decisions in criminal cases from the state courts fell sharply from an average
of 20 per Termnin 1985-1990 to 6 per Term in 1991-1999. Supreme CourtStatistics,supranote
112. Habeas cases also dropped, though less significantly - from 10 per Term to 7 per Term
over the same period. Id. The substantial decline in state criminal cases tends to suggest that
the statist realignment is explained more by a control realignment than by a homogeneity
brought about by a uniform course of judicial appointments to the lower federal bench. See
Heilman, supra note 6, at 420 (suggesting control realignment theory). One should note,
however, that part of the explanation here may also be that the state courts are learning to
interpret and apply the jurisdictional rules laid down in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(1983), which permit them to insulate more "liberal" criminal decisions from Supreme Court
review by placing such rulings on adequate and independent state constitutional grounds. See
generally Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State CourtActipism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985)
(discussing this interaction between state courts and Supreme Court). By contrast, the number
of plenary decisions in federal criminal cases actually increased over the same period, from 10
per Term to 12 per Term, see Supreme Court Statistics, supra note 112, though this was
undoubtedly due to the steep increase that has occurred in federal criminal litigation. See supra
notes 171-72 and accompanying text (describing increase in number of federal criminal cases).
202. See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text (describing decline in docket during
Vinson Court era).
203. See PALMER, supra note 57, at 229-58; 291-317 (tabulating votes by each Justice
during 1948 Term and 1950 Term, respectively).
204. See id. at 56-57 tbls. 5.1 & 5.2, 79-81 tbls. 6.1 & 6.2 (tabulating voting rates).
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Around the period of the most recent decline there were six retirements:
Chief Justice Burger in 1986, Justice Powell in 1987, Justice Brennan in 1990,
Justice Marshall in 1991, Justice White in 1993, and Justice Blackmun in
1994. The question posed here is whether these changes in personnel, taken
singly or together, caused any systematic change in the frequency with which
the Court decides to grant review.
Two previous studies provide indirect support for the view that such
changes may have played an important role in the decline. In a 1996 article,
Professor Hellman analyzed five potential external causes of the shrinling
docket. 20 5 He concluded that they did little to explain the phenomenon, and
went on to speculate from comments made by individual Justices that, following the recent retirements, the Court had become more comfortable with using
fewer precedents to supervise the lower courts.2"e Professor O'Brien reached
a similar conclusion after examining some of the internal procedures that the
Court employs in exercising its discretionary power to grant plenary review. 2"
Extrapolating from the Justices' published dissents from denial of review, as
well as the growth and subsequent decline of a new and seemingly permissive
procedure-the "Join-3" vote- he surmised that "changes inthe Court's composition and case selection process" probably caused the recent contraction
of the plenary docket.2"e
The difficulty in gauging the impact of changes in personnel stems from
the secrecy ofthe Supreme Court's internal deliberations in disposing ofapplications for review. Although Justice Douglas urged otherwise, the Court does
not publish eventhe votes cast in cases not accepted for argument. 209 Thus, in
205. See Hellman, supra note 6, at 408-25 (examining repeal of mandatory jurisdiction,
retirement of liberal Justices, homogeneity of circuit courts leading to fewer circuit conflicts,
fewer appeals by federal government, and conservative lower courts handing down fewer

"activist" opinions).
206. See id. at 425-32 (discussing this theory). Because Professor Hellman does not use
any data concerning the Justices' conference votes, his considerable analysis of other potential
causes arrives at personnel changes almost as a default explanation, without any direct evidence
to confirm that it is correct See id.at 408-32.
207. See O'Brien, supranote 6, at 784-807 (discussing mechanisms Supreme Court uses
in deciding to grant review).
208. Id. at 799. The Court has long employed the "Rule of Four," under which the Court
will grant certiorari if at least four Justices vote to do so. See id. at 784-86 (describing history
of Rule of Four). Some Justices have cast "Join-3" votes, which is a vote to grant review if, but
at least three other Justices vote in favor of review. See id. at 788-99 (describing rise
only if,
and subsequent decline of Join-3 vote).
209. See WII.UAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 39 (1980) (describing
Justice Douglas's desire to reveal votes). Two policy justifications are offered for this secrecy:
disposing of applications for review without indicating their views of the merits tends to
minimize the burden of the Justices' internal deliberations as well as maximize their freedom
by not confining their future decisionmaking in any way. See, e.g., John M. Harlan, Manning
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order to get a sense of whether certain Justices are more prone to grant review
than others, it is necessary to read such tea leaves as are available.
Professor O'Brien points out that notations of votes to grant and dissents
from denial of review - in which individual Justices state publicly how they
cast their vote in conference - are one indicator, since they at least display a
willingness to press the Court to grant review in that one additional case.
They may also (but need not) be coupled with expressions of impatience about
the Court's reluctance to grant review more frequenly.210 Professor O'Brien's
research demonstrates that Justices White, Marshall, and Brennan noted votes
to grant review and dissented from denial of review far more frequently than
the Justices who replaced them, which he took as suggesting that these newer
Justices are less inclined to grant review in general."
These signs must be read with caution, however, because there is no
necessary correlation between a willingness to vote for plenary review and a
willingness to register that vote publicly. 212 In other words, a Justice might be
the Dikes, 13 REc. A.B. CITYN.Y. 541,556-57 (1958) (discussing certiorari process). Because
these justifications would never be accepted in disposing of cases on the merits, this view seems
to rest on an assumption that the Court's agenda-setting work is less important than its merits
work, and thus the former should not interfere with the latter. See id. at 559 ("On the other
hand, certiorari would be self-defeating if its demands upon the Court's time were allowed to

impinge upon the adjudicatory process. For after all the Court exists to adjudicate cases, and
certiorari is but an ancillary process designed to promote the appropriate discharge of that
duty."). Although this assumption is fairly widespread, as indicated by proposals that have been
made to delegate much of the Court's screening function to a different tribunal, see, e.g.,
FR~uN REPORT, supra note 1, at 590-95 (discussing proposal for national appellate court), it
deserves further scrutiny. See, e.g., Harper & Leibowitz, supra note 71, at 457 (stating that
"[t]he work which the Supreme Court does not do is as important as the work which it does");
Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari. Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the

Judges'Bill, 100 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1643,1737 (2000) ("Indeed, the Supreme Court's power to
set its agenda may be more important than what the Court decides on the merits."); see also id.

at 1723-25 (discussing effects of secrecy).
210. Justice White's dissents from denial of certiorari sometimes urged the Court to adopt
a systematic policy of granting review in more cases. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497
U.S. 1038 (1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing for review of cases
presenting issues that divide courts of appeals); Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (same). Other Justices have urged the Court to
grant review in certain categories of cases, see, e.g.,Apelby v. California, 439 U.S. 1051 (1978)
(Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (obscenity); Smith v.
Hopper, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(capital punishment), or simply registered their dissent on a case-by-case basis, see, e.g., Berg
v. Berger, 439 U.S. 992 (1978) (Poweli, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). See generally
Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1266-77 (1979)

(discussing and analyzing different types of such dissents).
211. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 805-07 & fig. 6 (discussing these votes).
212. Indeed, Justice Douglas stated that he and Justice Black shared the view that all such
votes should be made public, see WILnnAMO. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNGMAN 452 (1974), yet

THE SUPREME COURT'SPLENARYDOCKET
willing to announce all such votes and yet still might support plenary review
less often than another Justice who refuses to make any disclosure at all.213
Thus this supposed indicator could turn out to be quite misleading, and in fact

it is. Most notably, as our data on the Justices' conference votes shows,
Justices Brennan and Marshall frequently were public dissenters from denial
of review on the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, yet it turns out that they voted
relatively infrequently to grant review during this same period."'
Professor O'Brien also pierced the judicial veil to a limited extent by
using The Thurgood Marshall Papers to shed light on the Justices' voting

behavior at conference, though he evaluated only how often individual Justices cast Join-3 votes in those cases where the Court granted plenary
review.21 His premise was that such votes lower the threshold for granting
plenary review by breaching the traditional "Rule of Four," which requires
four Justices to vote in favor of review before the Court will accept a case on
the merits. 21 6 He found that, during the 1979 to 1990 Terms, the Justices
placed at least twelve percent of the cases on the plenary docket with fewer

than four outright votes to grant plus one or more Join-3 votes. 217 He then
noted that several of the Justices most inclined to use the Join-3 vote retired
in the early 1990s, which he offered as further evidence that the decline in the

Court's plenary docket is attributable to changes in the Court's composition. 1

he dissented from denial of certiorari more than five times as often as Justice Black did in the
1969 and 1970 Terms. See HRUSKA REPORT, supra note 2, at 326 tbL I (presenting these

statistics).
213. Moreover, simply counting the number of dissents from denial of certiorari can be
quite misleading as an indicator of how much the Court would affect the plenary docket by
granting review in those cases, as the Justices who cast what have been described as "irredentist" votes in specific categories of cases (e.g., Justices Brennan and Marshall in capital punishment cases) do so not primarily to prompt the Court to grant review in all such cases, but rather
to encourage the Court to grant a few such cases to shift the direction of the Court's jurisprudence. See Linzer, supra note 210, at 1269-73; cf id. at 1258 n.221 (noting that eliminating
so-called "irredentist" dissents by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart brings their numbers

"in line with their colleagues").
214. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 805-07 & fig. 6 (noting particularly Justices Brennan
and Marshall's dissents from denial of review in death penalty cases); see also infra notes 25464 and accompanying text (discussing effects of Justices Brennan and Marshall's retirements
on Court's docket).
215. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 797-98 (using Justice Marshall's Bench Memos to
determine which cases made their way to plenary docket with help of Join-3 votes). Because
some ofJustice Marshall's Bench Memos were missing, Professor O'Brien was unable to obtain
a complete count. Id. at 797 & n.121.
216. See id. at 798 (describing use of Join-3 votes).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 799. Justice Blackmun cast such votes far more frequently than any other
Justice. See id. at 795-99 tbl. 1 & fig. 4 (tabulating these votes). Although Chief Justice Burger
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It bears emphasis, however, that the usefulness ofthis data on Join-3 votes
turns on the meaning of such votes. If Justices casting a Join-3 vote would
have cast a vote to grant review had Join-3 not been an option, then the data
reveals little about the Justices' overall inclination to grant cases. If, on the
other hand, a Join-3 vote is cast in lieu of a vote to deny, then it does suggest
a willingness to erode the Rule of Four. Although there is little information on
what the individual Justices meant by their Join-3 votes, Chief Justice
Rehnquist did opine in a letter to Professor O'Brien that: "It may be that this
vote has various meanings, depending on who casts it. But my sense has
always been that it is a more tentative vote than a 'grant,' and that if there are
19
three to join, the person who casts the vote may nonetheless reconsider it.0
In practice, however, a Join-3 vote functions in the same manner as a
vote to grant review. When a Justice votes to grant certiorari (or to note probable jurisdiction over an appeal), this vote is precisely a statement of willingness to join at least three colleagues in setting the case for full review. The
"Join-3" formulation is simply more explicit in placing the vote on a basis that
appears more collegial. This point is demonstrated by cases in which two
Justices voted to grant review and two Justices cast Join-3 votes, which the
Court counted as the four votes needed to accept the case on the merits, even
without the presence of three grant votes for anyone to 'Join." ° This is not
to say that the procedural innovation has no consequences: perhaps the
availability of the "Join-3" phrasing led Justices with less definite views on
particular cases to opt for this more accommodating option rather than voting
to deny, and perhaps this more diplomatic phrasing was taken as more inviting
of the other Justices' consideration, thus inclining them more toward voting
to grant themselves. 1 But there is no necessary correlation between frequent
use of the Join-3 vote and a high overall grant rate. Indeed, our data on conference votes demonstrates that Join-3 votes are not a reliable indicator of a
and Justices O'Connor, Marshall, Rehnquist, White, Powell, and Brennan cast Join-3 votes with
some frequency, Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy rarely, if ever, did. See id.
219. Id. at 788.
220. See id. at 798 (concluding that "Join-3 votes clearly lowered the threshold for granting
cases").
221.
This potential effect would be similar to the phenomenon described in Justice Van
DeVanter's comment from more than a half-century ago (outside the context of Join-3 votes,
which seem to be a peculiarity of the Burger Court era) that "if two or three justices strongly
desired to hear a case, the necessary remaining votes were sometimes volunteered by other
members of the Court." PROVINE, supra note 57, at 33. In this instance, plainly, the accommodating Justices changed their votes from a denial to a grant Professor Perry encountered the
same phenomenon in interviewing one of the Justices from the Burger Court era. See PERRY,
supranote 94, at 169 (discussing this process). As these examples show, however, the Justices
can and do make accommodations for one another without regard to whether they are casting
Join-3 votes.
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Justice's willingness to grant review. For example, on the Burger Court it
turns out that Justice Blaekmun cast by far the most Join-3 votes, followed by
Chief Justice Burger, yet both lagged far behind Justices White and Rehnquist
in voting to grant review.=
A better way to measure an individual Justice's willingness to grant
review would be, of course, to look directly at the number of such votes that
he or she cast in conference. As with the later scholarship analyzing the
changing docket of the Vinson Court, data on the actual votes cast would provide direct evidence of how the Justices' individual judgments about cases
actually translate into expansion or contraction of their plenary docket.'
The grant rate for a particular Justice is likely to reflect many subtle
elements of his or her outlook on the role that the Supreme Court should play
in the judicial system, the government as a whole, and American life. It cornbines aspects of personality, judicial philosophy, practical administration,
political theory, and historical perspective. Justices who subscribe to very different viewpoints on these matters have made comments that illustrate this
point. Justice Douglas asserted that "thejob here [deciding whether to grant
plenary review] is so highly personal, depending on the judgment, discretion,
and experience and point of view of each of the nine of us." 4 Justice Harlan
stated that "[fIrequently the question whether a case is 'certworthy' is more a
matter of 'feel' than of precisely ascertainable rules."225 Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that "[w]hether or not to vote to grant certiorari strikes me as a
rather subjective
decision, made up in part of intuition and inpart of legal judg,, 6
ment. 2
The availability of the private papers of some of the recently retired
Justices, which include the conference votes recorded in their docket books,
offers new opportunities to compile grant rates at least for those Justices who
served on the Court before Justice Marshall's retirement atthe end of the 1990
Term. Although these sources do not allow calculation of grant rates for all
of the current Justices, they offer ample information to enable us to draw
much more definitive conclusions than have previously been possible. With
invaluable assistance from personnel at the Program for Law and Judicial
222. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text (discussing voting behavior of these
Justices). We should emphasize here that the figures we have compiled for grant votes include
each Justice's Join-3 votes. See infra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing treatment
of Join-3 votes by Justices).
223. See generally PALMER, supra note 57 (discussing case selection by Vinson Court);
PROVIE, supranote 57 (same). See also supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text (discussing

data on conference voting behavior from Vimson Court).
224.
225.
226.

DOUGLAs, supra note 209, at 175-76.
Harlan, supra note 209, at 549.
W iIAmH. REHNQUsT,THESUPREMECOURT: HOWITWAS,HoWITIS 265(1987).
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Politics at Michigan State University, who work regularly with the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database and its expanded version,' we have been able
to determine the rate at which each Justice voted to grant plenary review (of
appeals and petitions for certiorari) during the Burger Court era. We then
supplemented this information for the Rehnquist Court by counting the conference votes from Justice Marshall's docket books, which cover the ensuing
years until his retirement after the 1990 Term.
The cumulative data suggests that the grant rates of individual Justices,
relative to one another, tend to remain fairly constant over time, reflecting a
general outlook that does not vary appreciably from one Term to the next.
Careful analysis of the conference votes from both the Vinson and Warren

Courts, for example, demonstrated that the Justices '"mded to be consistent
in the strength of their propensity to vote for review" and so the "rank order
of the justices thus remained fairly constant over the entire period."'
The
data now available from the Judicial Database, supplemented by our own data,
demonstrates that the same was largely true for the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts."s° Indeed, the two clear exceptions to the general rule occurred with
the transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court, when the sharp
change in the direction of the Court appears to have correlated with a decline
227. The U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database, compiled by Professor Harold J. Spaeth
in the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University, provides the basis for
much ofthe careful statistical information found in the invaluable Supreme Court Compendium.
See SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3. The Database itself originally contained
massive amounts of information about Supreme Court cases decided on the merits. In recent
years, the Database has been expanded to include data on conference votes painstakingly
compiled from docket books in the private papers of various retired Justices. We are indebted
to Professor Spaeth for his willingness to share with us some of this information that is not yet
published, and to Professor Reginald S. Sheehan, the Director of the Program for Law and
Judicial Politics at Michigan State University, for his willingness to allow us broad access to
the computerized database. Finally, we want to express our thanks to Kirk A. Randazzo, a
graduate student in the Program, for his careful and persistent efforts in generating the particular
data that we needed to analyze the Justices' conference votes for purposes of determining their
relative grant rates.
228. We are also indebted to Professor Gregory A. Caldeira of the Department of Political
Science at The Ohio State University, who shared with us the data he had developed from conference votes in the 1982 and 1990 Terms, and who generously took time to discuss and explain
the data. Professor Caldeira was also the source of the initial suggestion that we seek access to
the expanded U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database. All of this aggregated information on the
Justices' conference votes, including our own compilations from the docket books of Justice
Brennan and Justice Marshall, will be cited hereinafter simply as "Judicial Database."
229. PROVINE, supra note 57, at 114-15; see also id. at 104-72 (discussing differences
among individual Justices); PAdl, supra note 57, at 50-96 (discussing case selection practices).
230. See Judicial Database, supra note 228.

THE SUPREW COURT'S PLENARYDOCKET
in the number of votes cast for review by Justice Brennan and an increase in
the number cast by Justice White.M
To some extent, this relative consistency of each Justice's voting behav-

ior compared to that of his or her colleagues is not surprising, for at the
threshold stage of granting or denying review there is much less collective
deliberation (and no public recordkeeping), which might tend to influence or
shape an individual Justice's voting behavior over time.' 2 Certainly the
extent to which the nine Justices operate as "nine little law firms" is maxi-

mized here," 3 for the sheer number of separate decisions about whether to
grant review in particular cases means that, unlike in cases decided on the

merits, there is virtually no extended discussion at conference before individ34
ual votes are cast and hence "there is little opportunity for leadership."2
Indeed, at the height of the Court's supposed caseload crisis, Justice Stevens

noted the lack of collegial discussion about the Court's docket-setting function, wryly commenting that "[w]e were too busy to decide whether there was
231. See id. (noting voting rates of Justices). Justice Brennan went from being consistently
in the top tier of the Court in numbers of votes cast for review in the 1960s (averaging about
200 grant votes per Term) to the high end of the lower tier in the 1980s (averaging about 120
such votes per Term). Justice White's voting behavior was the reverse; he moved from the high
end of the lower tier in the 1960s (averaging about 150 grant votes per Term) to the very top
ofthe Courtin the 1980s (averaging about 210 such votes per Term). Each was fairly consistent
within each era. See id.These exceptions to the rule raise interesting questions about how each
Justice's voting behavior in granting review correlates with voting behavior on the merits, and
the extent to which concerns about the likely result on the merits affects the former. Both points
are worthy subjects for further study from the standpoint of the individual Justices' grant rates.
As we will see, Justice Rehnquist's ascension to Chief Justice presents a third and unique
exception to the general rule of consistency. See inra notes 243-44 and accompanying text
(discussing change in Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior after he became Chief Justice).
232. For example, Professor Perry quotes one justice as stating that "there are plenty of
strategic considerations, but I think those are really made in the individual chambers." PERRY,
supra note 94, at 201.
ON: HOwnm STPREMECOURTDECIDES CASES 6 (1996)
233. BERNARD SCHwARTzDE
(attributing this formulation to "a number of" Justices). Justice Jackson may have originated
this observation when he wrote in 1955 that "the Court functions less as one deliberative body
than as nine, each Justice working largely in isolation" and thus tending "to cultivate a highly
individualistic rather than a group viewpoint" ROBERT I JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN
TEAMmIucAN SYSTEM OF GOvERNmENT 16 (1955).
234. PERRY, supra note 94, at 91; see also Harlan,supranote 209, at 556 (stating that "the
great volume of petitions" precludes "the giving of reasons for denial in individual cases"). For
decades, the Court's use of an administrative mechanism known as the "discuss list" has allowed
most applications for review to be denied with no discussion at all, which happens when no
Justice identifies the case as meriting a vote in the conference. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 94,
at 85-91 (describing this process); see generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The
Discuss List: Agenda Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 807 (1990)

(same).
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anything we could do about the problem of being too busy." 5 The upshot is
that in the Court's modem era the Justices have rarely, if ever, made any
conscious choices about changing their internal standards for granting plenary
review; instead, the number of cases granted and hence their overall caseload
simply reflects the cumulative effect of each of their independent decisions."
The data on conference votes demonstrates that changes in the Court's
personnel have had a dramatic effect on the recent decline in the plenary
docket. In the last decade of the Burger Court, the two Justices who consistently voted most frequently to grant plenary review were Justices White and
Rehnquist, sometimes by a wide margin over their colleagues. 37 Justices
Blackmun, O'Connor, and Powell (usually in that order) were in the middle
of the Court, followed by Chief Justice Burger; throughout this period, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens uniformly voted least often to grant
review."' The figures for Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger are
regularly fortified by their more frequent use of the Join-3 vote, which functions in our compilations the same way it does at the conference, when the
Justices themselves count it as a vote to grant plenary review."'
In 1986, Chief Justice Burger retired and Justice Scalia replaced him on
the Court. The nomination and confirmation process was an unusual tandem
arrangement, because at the same time President Reagan filled the vacancy on
the Court, he elevated Justice Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice.24
235. Stevens, supra note 23, at 179; see also Duffy, supranote 34, at 11 (quoting Justice
Souter's observations that Justices "hadn't done anything about [the docket] whatsoever, it had
in fact just happened," and that "nobody sets a quota, nobody sits at the conference table and
says 'We've taken too much. We must pull back.' It simply has happened.").
236. See, e.g., PROVINE, supra note 57, at 104-72 (reaching similar conclusions); PALMER,
supra note 57, at 50-96 (same). Justice Souter stated of the recent decline in the docket that "I
know of no one on my court who thinks that we're turning away cases which by traditional
standards of grants of certiorari we should be taking." Duffy, supra note 34, at 11. In 1983,
Justice Stevens suggested that the Court consider temporarily or permanently abandoning the
Rule of Four as one way to tighten its criteria for granting discretionary review, see John Paul
Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 10-21 (1983), but the
suggestion was never adopted. It is unclear when the Rule of Four itself originated, but such
evidence as exists suggests that it was already firmly in place, and perhaps had been for decades,
when Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1925. See Joan Maisel Leiman, The Rule ofFour,
57 CoLUM. L. REv. 976,981-82 & n.37 (1957) (discussing origins of Rule of Four).
237. In the 1982 Term, for example, these two Justices voted to grant review in more than
230 cases each, whereas no other Justice cast as many as 170 votes to grant review. Judicial
Database, supra note 228.
238. Ia
239. Id.; see also supranote 220 and accompanying text (discussing use of Join-3 vote).
240. See generally SAVAGE, supra note 201, at 3-25 (describing transition between Chief
Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist and appointment of Justice Scalia).
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The next year, Justice Powell retired and was replaced by Justice Kennedy,
after months of delays caused by confirmation battles in the Senate. 241 The
numbers reveal that each of these three changes on the Court played a discernible part in shrinking the docket. Over the course of the next several Terms,
both Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy settled into abnegating roles in the
discretionary review process, voting to grant review less often than any other
Justice, including Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.242 Two Justices
from the middle tier of the Court were thus replaced by two Justices who
voted much less frequently to grant review. At the same time, the voting
behavior of now-Chief Justice Rehnquist underwent a dramatic change; from
keeping pace with Justice White in an aggressively pro-review first tier on the
Court, his total votes for plenary review gradually slipped to where he eventually relinquished the second place to Justice Blackmun. 43 This sudden and
marked change in an individual Justice's voting behavior stands as one further
exception to the rule of general consistency, though it seems to be directly
linked to Justice Rehnquist's perception of his new and distinct role as the
Chief Justice. 2 4
The consequent shift in the Court's direction was quite significant. The
replacement of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell with Justices Scalia
and Kennedy had the overall effect of almost erasing the complement of votes
cast by an average Justice for plenary review in a given Term.245 In addition,
the relocation of Chief Justice Rehnquist from the high end of the spectrum
to somewhere in the middle had a comparable effect in diminishing the total
number of grant votes cast in a given Term.24 6 In effect, the aggregate result
of these changes in personnel was roughly as if the Rule of Four were now
being made to operate on a court composed of slightly more than seven of its
241. See generallyid. at 128-82 (describing this transition).
242. In our tabulations of the 1989 and 1990 Terms, for example, Justice Kennedy voted
on average to grant review in about 95 cases per Term, and Justice Scalia did so about 85 times
per Term. Judicial Database, supra note 228. Justice Stevens had the next lowest total, averaging about 100 such votes per Term. Id.
243. Id. From voting to grant plenary review more than 240 times as an Associate Justice
in the 1982 Term, for example, as the Chief Justice, Rehnquist averaged only about 120 such
votes in the 1989-1990 Terms. Id.
244. See Heilman, supra note 6, at 430 n.57 (noting that Chief Justice Rehnquist has since
stated that "he no longer votes to take a case just because it is 'interesting'" (quoting Biskupic,
supra note 37, at A15)). Professor O'Brien also points out that Chief Justice Rehnquist has
published far fewer dissents from denial of certiorad than he had as Associate Justice. See
O'Brien, supranote 6, at 807.
245. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 6, at 807 (noting that there were 272 votes for plenary
review by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in the 1982 Term versus 162 such votes by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy in the 1989 Term).
246. See supranote 243 (discussing change in Chief Justice Rehnquist's voting behavior).

58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 737 (2001)

786

former members, ratherthannine.24 The Court's docket bears out this observation, as the number of plenary decisions fell from 156 inthe 1985 Term to
132 in the 1989 Tenn.24
The effect on the Court's docket, though substantial, was not immediately
recognized. Neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Powell had been outspoken advocates for deciding more cases; on the contrary, both had expressed
concern about the Court's workload, and the Chief Justice had led the institutional efforts to gain relief from a docket he viewed as overcrowded.2 49 The
first article noting this new development did not appear until midway through
the 1989 Term, when a reporter for the Washington Post drew attention to the
Court's unusually light caseload." ° And indeed, the real impact was not felt
right away because the decline in Chief Justice Rehnquist's vote totals occurred gradually over his first four Terms."' Thus the numbers were initially
deceiving- 155 plenary decisions inthe 1986 Term, 148 inthe 1987
Term, and
52
145 inthe 1988 Term, before fMlling to 132 inthe 1989 Term.
At this point, two more retirements occurred: Justice Souter replaced
Justice Brennan after the 1989 Term, and Justice Thomas replaced Justice
Marshall after the 1990 Term. The erosion of the Court's docket had continued even before these events occurred, as approximately half of the argument
calendar for the 1990 Term was already set before Justice Brennan's retirement, and the number of plenary decisions declined again to 116 in that
Terim2S Although there has been some speculation that the retirements of4
these two most liberal Justices caused or accelerated the docket's decline,2
247. This vivid illustration of the effect of the personnel changes is necessarily somewhat
crude, as it is not obvious that probability theory would conclude that the chances of garnering
at least four votes in a given case are exactly the same if the same total number of votes is
spread among nine participants than if it is concentrated among seven - a point that warrants
further analysis in considering how some of the practical mechanics of agenda-setting may differ
between the federal and state supreme courts.
248. SUPREM COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7.
249. See Warren E. Burger, The Time isNowfor the IntercircuitPanel, 71 A.BA J. 86,

86-91 (Apr. 1985) (reiterating his concerns about Court's workload and proposing modification
of Freund and Hruska proposals for national court of appeals); Alsup, supra note 20, at 1322
(noting that Chief Justice Burger had emphasized that "something must be done to stem the
swelling tide of applications for review," and that Justice Powell had expressed concern that
"the Court is now inundated and some plan of relief is sorely needed").
250. See Marcus, supranote 35, at A4 (discussing reduction in Court's caseload).
251. Judicial Database, supranote 228.
252. SLPRME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7.
253.

Id.

254.

See, e.g., Elsasser,supra note 6, at 7 (quoting law professors opining that "liberalism

is dead" on current Court and that retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall had "aprofound
effect" on decline in docket); O'Brien, supra note 6, at 799 (suggesting similar reasons for
decline); Starr, supra note 37, atA23 (same).
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in retrospect the evidence for this view appears scant. To begin with, for
many years both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall had established themselves at the low end of the spectrum in voting to grant review."5 And figures
from Justice Souter's partial participation in conference votes for the 1990

Term suggest that he may support plenary review about as often as Justice

Brennan did. 6 Even if Justice Thomas's voting behavior on discretionary
review were similar to that of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, which seems
plausible but not inevitable,2 7 it is hard to envision how these two changes in
personnel, taken together, would have caused any appreciable decline in the

Court's docket.2 8
The numbers again seem to bear this out, as the number of plenary decisions briefly stabilized at 116 in the 1990 Tern, 110 in the 1991 Tenn, and
III in the 1992 Term. 9 Of course, it is quite plausible that Justices Brennan
and Marshall may have cast different kands of votes on discretionary review,
and hence their departure from the Court might have depressed the numbers
in certain categories of cases that were set for plenary review.2'c The records
for their conference votes show, for example, that these two Justices voted
more frequently than any other Justice to grant review of criminal cases filed
informapauperis.n In the first four Terms ofthe Rehnquist Court, Justices
255. By the beginning of the Rehnquist Court, for example, Justice Brennan was averaging
about 120 votes to grant review per Term, and Justice Marshall was averaging about 110 such
votes per Term, fewer than any Justice other than Justice Stevens. Judicial Database, supranote
228.
256. Justice Souter was not sworn in until October 9, 1990, shortly after the commencement ofthe 1990 Term, see SUPnREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 3, at 348 tbl. 5-2 (noting
date Justice Souter's service began), which means that, as is often true of new Justices, he did
not cast conference votes on many of the cases that had built up over the summer recess. See
Judicial Database, supra note 228. Over the balance of the Term, his grant rate was comparable
to Justice Brennan's in his last several Terms.
257. During each of his first seven Terms on the Court, Justice Thomas voted more often
with Justice Scalia on the merits than with any other Justice, see Supreme Court Statistics, supra
note 112, though voting behavior on the merits does not necessarily translate directly into
similar voting behavior on discretionary review.
258. For example, if Justice Souter were to fall near the low end of the middle tier, then
even if Justice Thomas were as sparing as Justice Scalia in voting for review, substituting
Justices Souter and Thomas for Justices Brennan and Marshall would yield overall vote totals
that were roughly equivalent See Judicial Database, supra note 228.
259.
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 thl. 2-7.
260. See, e.g., Savage, supra note 6, at 40 (stating that "the Court has no active liberal
faction inclined to reach out to take on new issues"); Elsasser, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that
Justices Brennan and Marshall were "moved by the individual results in a case" and were
willing to take cases with unfair results even if they did not meet Court's "general criteria for
granting review") (quotation omitted).
261. During the 1988 and 1989 Terms, for example, Justices Brennan and Marshall averaged more than 30 votes per Term to grant review in such cases, and Justices Stevens (28),
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Brennan and Marshall formed part of a four-vote bloc (usually with Justices
Stevens and Blackmun) to grant review in about five such cases per Term.262
One might thus have expected at least this many informapauperiscases, and
perhaps even more, to vanish from the plenary calendar after they left the
Court. Yet there was no significant decline inthe number ofinformapauperis
cases: the Court granted 74 such cases in the 1986-1989 Terms, and 62 such
cases in the 1991-1994 Terms - a drop of only three cases per Tenn.263 Even
from this perspective, it thus seems that these retirements had only a limited
effect on the continuing decline in the docket.2 4
The final round of retirements came in 1993, when Justice Ginsburg
replaced Justice White, and in 1994, when Justice Breyer replaced Justice

Blackmun. Although no data is available yet to enable us to calculate individual grant rates for these new Justices, it is clear that these two changes
had a profound influence on the shrinking of the docket. For many years,

Justice White had been the Court's most outspoken advocate for granting
review in more cases, particularly those involving conflicts among the lower
White (27), and Blackmun (18) also cast such votes with some frequency. By contrast, the other
four Justices averaged only about 10 such votes per Term. Judicial Database, supra note 228.
At the same time, however, it is likely that Justices Brennan and Marshall often engaged in
"defensive denials" by voting not to grant review in such cases when they were concerned about
an adverse result on the merits. See, e.g., PERRY, supra note 94, at 198-207 (discussing this
practice). The interesting subject of strategic voting in deciding whether to support review in
particular cases has spawned a considerable political science literature, built in part on the conference data available from Justice Burton's docket books, but not yet updated in light of the
more recent data that since has become available. See, e.g., id. at 12-15 (discussing voting
strategies at certiorari stage); S. Sydney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorarias an Indicator to Decision "on the Merits,"4 POUTY 429 (1972) (same); Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649 (1979) (same); Gregory A Caldeira, The United States Supreme
Court and Criminal Cases, 1935-1976: Alternative Models ofAgenda Building, 11 BRrr. J.
POL. Sc. 449 (Oct 1981) (same).
262. Judicial Database, supranote 228. This number may underrepresent the influence of
Justices Brennan and Marshall, insofar as the other Justices' awareness of the four-vote bloc
may have inclined them to vote to grant more frequently in such cases, thus causing fewer cases
to be granted with the bare minimum of votes.
263. SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 82-83 tbL 2-6. Moreover, in cases
in which the Court granted review on a bare four votes during the 1988 and 1989 Terms, neither
Justice Brennan nor Justice Marshall provided the essential fourth vote in an unusual number
of cases; indeed, both Justices were about at the Court's average in this regard. Judicial Database, supra note 228.
264. The data from the docket books thus tends to confirm Professor Hellman's view that
the retirements of the three most liberal Justices (including Justice Blackmun) was not a major
factor in the shrinking docket, which he bases on his finding that "the total number of 'liberal
grants,'" even when they served on the Court, was so small that "any decline could not possibly
have played a major role in the reduction in the overall level of plenary activity." Heilman,
supra note 6, at 413.
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courts. 265 His voting behavior mirrored his public comments; throughout the
first five Terms of the Rehnquist Court, he consistently had far and away the
highest grant rate on the Court, routinely casting almost twice as many such
votes as the average for the other Justices. 266 Justice Blackmun had always
been at the high end of the Court's middle tier, making far more frequent use
of the Join-3 vote than his colleagues.267 By the 1990 Term, he was voting for
2
review more often than any Justice other than Justice White. 1
The retirement of these two Justices caused an immediate further decline
in the number of plenary decisions, to levels never before seen in the Court's
modem era. The Court issued 90 plenary decisions in the 1993 Term, 85 in
the 1994 Term, and only 78 inthe 1995 Term. 269 The numbers have remained
at this level as the composition of the Court has remained unchanged, eventually reaching a new low of 76 plenary decisions inthe 1999 Term." In light
of the conference data now available, these unprecedented results are understandable. Justice White's voting behavior was so extraordinary that replac265. Most often, Justice White pressed his point by dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in specific cases, though he occasionally made a broader point by urging the Court to grant
review in more cases across the board. See, e.g., Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038
(1990) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Court should take more
eases involving circuit conflicts); Metheny v. Hamby, 488 U.S. 913 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (same). Professor O'Brien notes that the number of Justice
White's dissents in this regard "increased significantly in the late 1980s and early 1990s."
O'Brien, supranote 6, at 792; see also id.at 793 & fig. 3 (noting number of cases Justice White
would have added to Supreme Court's docket). There also can be little doubt that Justice White
is the "Justice G" referred to in Professor Perry's book, who felt "that many cases the Court
denies should be granted" and thus took "a very strong and leading role on cert." in the discussions at conference. PERRY, supranote 94, at 89-90; see also HUTCHNSON, supra note 58, at
355-56, 382, 400-01,419-21,431 (discussing Justice White's influence, particularly in setting
agenda for Court's docket).
266. In the 1988-1989 Terms, Justice White averaged almost 200 grant votes per Term,
whereas his colleagues averaged just over 100. Judicial Database, supra note 228. Moreover,
in cases that were granted on a bare four votes during those Terms, Justice White provided the
essential fourth vote for review more frequently than any other Justice. Id.
267. Id.; see also O'Brien, supranote 6, at 795-99 & fig. 4 (tabulating use of Join-3 votes).
268. Judicial Database, supra note 228. Our tabulations indicate that in the 1988-1989
Terms, Justice Blackmun averaged about 120 votes to grant review per Term, far behind Justice
White and slightly behind Chief Justice Rehnquist, but considerably ahead of every other
Justice. Id. Over the same period, Justice Blackmun trailed only Justice White in providing the
essential fourth vote for review, and both of them did so far more often than any other Justice.
Id.
269. SuPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7. Since Congress enacted
the Judiciary Act of 1925, the only previous Terms in which the Court had issued fewer than
100 plenary decisions were the 1953 Term (88) and the 1954 Term (94). Id. at 84.
270. See StatisticalRecap, supra note 4, 69 U.S.L.W. at 3134 (tabulating caseload of
Supreme Court).
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ing him by someone with even an average grant rate would be tantamount to
eliminating the votes cast by a typical Justice for plenary review in a given
Term. 1 At the same time, it is highly unlikely that the retirement of Justice
Blackmun led to any increase in total grant votes, as he had become firmly
established toward the high end of the spectrurmn 2 In addition, the tenor of
their academic writings suggests that neither Justice Ginsburg nor Justice
Breyer would press for any expansion in the Court's plenary docket." Aggregated with the effects of the 1986-87 retirements, therefore, the effect of
these changes was to squeeze the Rule of Four even further, as if it were now
being made to operate on a court composed of fewer than six of the former
members of the Burger Court.
The cumulative effect of these changes in the Court's membership thus
appears to have been dramatic. Quite apart from issues about who was winning and losing in the lower courts, and what parties were seeking review in
which cases from one Term to the next, it is now evident that the Court's
personnel changes over this decade were a substantial independent cause of
the remarkable decline in its docket.
F Growth of the "CertPool"
The foregoing analysis also helps dispel another explanation that has
been offered for the declining docket - the allegedly excessive influence of
law clerks in screening out cases through operation of the "cert pool. 'i 4 In
1972, Chief Justice Burger instituted a new procedure for "pooling" the law
clerks of Justices who were willing to have them share the task of preparing
271. Judicial Database, supra note 228; see also supra note 266 and accompanying text
(discussing Justice White's voting behavior).
272. Judicial Database, supra note 228. In fact, as mentioned earlier, by the 1989 and
1990 Terms, Justice Blackmun had moved ahead of Chief Justice Rehnquist for second place
on the Court, behind only Justice White in total votes cast for plenary review. Id.
273. Before her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Ginsburg explicitly noted that
the Court could manage any excess in its discretionary merits docket by simply cutting back the
number of plenary decisions on its own. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The
IntercircuitCommittee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1418 (1987) (discussing Supreme Court's
workload). In the same vein, Justice Breyer had opined that having "too many decisions is, in
a sense, the same as having too few," and that it is thus desirable to keep "the important lawdeclaring decisions limited to a number that the legal community can take notice of, criticize,
and elaborate upon." Stephen Breyer,AdministeringJustice in the First Circuit,24 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 29, 40 (1990). We are left to rely on this anecdotal evidence, cf supra note 74
(noting Professor Hellman's reliance on anecdotal evidence in absence of data), at least until
the docket books of Justice Blackmun and any future retired Justices may be opened to the
public.
274. See, e.g.,Biskupic, supranote 36, atA6 (noting argument that "cert pool" substantially
affects docket size); Savage, supranote 6, at 42 (same); Starr, supranote 37, atA23 (same).
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memoranda summarizing the applications for plenary review." This new
approach was intended to spread the burden of assisting the Justices in screening cases more equitably and efficiently. Traditionally, the Chief Justice's
clerks bore the entire task of preparing such memoranda for the in forma
pauperiscases, and clerks in each chambers would write separate memoranda
in the paid cases. 6 The cert pool included the paid cases also, which meant
that only one law clerk performed an initial screen in every case for participat-

ing Justices?

7

The mechanism ofthe cert pool was controversial from its inception, and
it remained so for years. Initially, five Justices joined the pool, though Justices
Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart declined. 218 Justice Douglas was
highly critical of the pool during his final years on the Court,' 9 and various
commentators have since voiced concerns that it delegates too much authority
to law clerks and has the undesirable effect of largely homogenizing the
Court's consideration of applications for review.?0
It seems unlikely, however, that the cert pool has had much systematic
influence on the votes cast by individual Justices to grant or deny plenary
review, at least when compared to the dominant factor of the Justices' own
predispositions. 1 All of the Justices had individualized screening mechanisms in place prior to the cert pool, which made varying use of the law
clerks.' Such supplemental procedures also remained after the pool was in
place, and it appears that the varying levels of scrutiny that individual Justices
give to the applications does not correlate with their participation in the
pool. 8 3 Moreover, the actual voting behavior of the Justices in the pool has
been far from uniform. For example, Justice White belonged to the pool for
275. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 790 (noting that Chief Justice Burger instituted change
upon suggestion of'Justice Powell).
276. See GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. POSNER, ThE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 72-73 (1976) (discussing Chief Justice's traditional role -with respect to unpaid cases).
277. See O'Brien,supranote 6, at 790 (noting this change in policy).
278. See CASPER & POSNER,supra note 276, at 72-73 (explaining origins of cert pool).
279. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 233, at 257 (quoting Justice Douglas calling law clerks
"Junior Supreme Court"); DOUGLAS, supranote 209, at 175-76 (criticizing growth of cert pool).
280. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
Poixris 83-84 (1986) (noting that clerks review hundreds of petitions before Term even
begins); SCHWARTZ, supranote 233, at 257-58 (noting criticisms of cert pool).
281. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 799-803 (arguing that pooling of clerks in certiorari
process does not determine amount of scrutiny given by Justices and concluding that it is
unclear whether this feature plays role in setting size of plenary docket).
282. See CASPER & POsNER, supra note 276, at 73 (describing these processes).
283. See O'BRIEN, supra note 280, at 131 (discussing views of Justices Brennan and
Stevens); PERRY, supranote 94, at 51-64 (discussing pool process in detail); REENQUIST, supra
note 226, at 264-67 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist's process).

58 WASH. & LEE L. REV 737 (2001)
his last two decades on the Court, yet he consistently supported plenary
review in many more cases thanthe other pool members. 4 Justice Blackmun,
though less extreme in this regard, also compiled a high grant rate relative to
the other pool members. 5 At the same time, from outside the pool, Justice
Stevens has had an index that is regularly below that of the average pool
member."s The supposed boundary between those Justices who do and do not
belong to the cert pool is further blurred by frequent consultations among their
law clerks. 281
Indeed, for the first fifteen years after the cert pool made its debut, the
number of cases granted plenary review remained in the range of 150 cases
per Term.28 The single period of decline during this period occurred after
Justice Stevens replaced Justice Douglas in 1975."' Neither belonged to the
pool, however, and the drop in the caseload is traceable instead to their very
different views of the Court's optimal capacity to hear and decide cases. 2 °
Notably, after Justice O'Connor arrived at the Court in 1981 - and joined the
cert pool, unlike her predecessor, Justice Stewart - the plenary docket rose
again to about 150 cases per Term, and remained there for the next eight
Terms.' This pattern defies explanation ifthe excessive influence of a larger
cert pool is an important factor in depressing the Court's docket. It is more
likely that the clerks' initial screening simply helps in weeding out the great
mass of cases that are universally viewed as marginal and in focusing attention on the remainder.'
284. Judicial Database, supranote 228.
285. Id.
286. Id.; see also O'Brien,supra note 6, at 795 & n.l 19 (noting that Justice Stevens urged
Court not to take cases "pointlessly").
287. See PERRY, supranote 94, at 54-55 (discussing this collaboration).
288.
SUPREME CouRT CoMPEDIUM, supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7.
Justice Stevens joined the Court during the 1975 Term. Id. at 347 tbl. 5-2. The
289.
number of plenary decisions that Term was 154, which declined to 148,137,138,142, and 131
over the next five Terms. Id. at tbl. 2-7.
290.
Justice Douglas regularly had one of the highest grant rates on the Court, see
PROVINE, supranote 57, at 114-15 tbL 4.5, whereas Justice Stevens has consistently opined that
the Court's caseload crisis was of its own making, the result of granting review in more eases
than it should, see Stevens, supra note 236, at 16 ("For I think it is clear that the Court now
takes far too many cases. Indeed, I am persuaded that since the enactment of the Judges' Bill
in 1925, any mismanagement ofthe Court's docket has been in the direction of taking too many,
rather than too few, cases.").
291.
SUPRmmECOURTCOMPENDIUM,supranote 3, at 85 tbl. 2-7. Beginning-with the 1981
Term, the number of plenary decisions recovered to 151, 157,157, 150, and 156 over the next
five Terms. Id.
292. See O'BRIEN,supranote 280, at 190-91 (noting high percentage ofcases unanimously
rejected); REHNQUIST, supra note 226, at 264-67 (describing one to two thousand certiorari
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The only evidence that has been cited to the contrary is that when Justices Brennan and Marshall left the Court in 1990 and 1991, the number of
Justices in the cert pool rose from six to eight, with only Justice Stevens
remaining out. 3 Because this change occurred during the period of general
decline, it has been speculated that this factor may have played a significant
role in the changing docket 94 Yet the steep decline actually was well underway by this time, though there had been no other change in the level of
participation in the pool, and the decline intensified after Justices White and
Blackmun retired, even though both had been pool members and again no
change in pool participation resulted.' Even more decisive, however, is the
simple fact that Justices Brennan and Marshall themselves were voting to
grant fewer cases than most of their colleagues on the Rehnquist Court,
though neither belonged to the cert pool." Indeed, the only Justice outside
the pool whose index has ever been above the Court average was Justice
Douglas, and his voting behavior in this regard was well entrenched long
before the advent of the pool.' It thus seems virtually certain that the number of Justices in the cert pool has had little or nothing to do with the Court's
declining docket.
1I. ConclusionsAbout the ChangingDocket
The above analysis thus points to a multifaceted explanation for the
recent decline in the Supreme Court's plenary docket. At the outset, the
much-anticipated legislation restricting the Court's mandatory jurisdiction
appears to have had little or no effect on the caseload. Changes in the Court's
personnel, however, have played a substantial role in shrinking the docket. To
begin with, the substitution of Justice Scalia for Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Kennedy for Justice Powell, along with Justice Rehnquist's promotion
to Chief Justice, provided a considerable impetus to reduce the docket. This
petitions per year as "patently without merit"); Arthur J. Goldberg, One Supreme Court,NEW
REPuBuC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 15 (suggesting many cases are unworthy of review).
293. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 800 (noting that cert pool reached eight members with
Justice Thomas's addition). Professors Casper and Posner advocated such an expansion of the
cert pool in their 1976 monograph on the Supreme Court's workload. See CASPER & POSNER,
supra note 276, at 108-09.
294. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 799-800 (relating concerns expressed by Justices
Kennedy and Blackmun about having almost all Justices participating in cert pool); Starr, supra
note 37, atA23 (criticizing cert pool).
295.
See supra notes 253-73 and accompanying text (discussing correlation between
changes in personnel and reduction of Court's caseload).
296. See Judicial Database, supra note 228.
297. See id.; see also PAUJ4E, supra note 57, at 57 tbl. 5.2 & 81 tbl. 6.2 (showing that
Justice Douglas had highest grant rate on Court for 1949-1952 Terms).
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was followed in short order by the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall, which had less impact than might have been expected, even though it
cost the Court two votes and a more extensive lobbying effort for granting
review in certain kinds of cases. The final substantial shift occurred with the
retirements, soon afterwards, of Justices White and Blackmum. By their votes
at conference, as well as by Justice White's frequent prodding both in public
and private statements, these two Justices had strongly supported the Court
granting review on the merits in more cases. When Justices who appear to
have more moderate viewpoints on this issue replaced Justices White and
Blackmun, the docket immediately plunged. Not since 1949 - the year in
which Justices Clark and Minton replaced Justices Murphy and Rutledge had such a massacre of certiorari votes occurred on the Court.
In addition, an important influence that has independently contributed to
the decline is the changing pattern of federal civil litigation involving government parties. Over the same period, the federal government was winning
more of its fewer civil cases in the lower courts and thus was seeking plenary
review less frequently. Similar factors were also at work in civil litigation
involving the state and local governments and in criminal cases (though the
numbers here were partially offset by a rising tide of federal criminal prosecutions), as for a generation the Supreme Court had asserted its control over the
direction of the lower courts and presided over some version of a judicial
realignment. Our analysis indicates that these factors - even apart from any
changes in the Court's personnel - may have been responsible for as much as
half of the overall reduction in the plenary docket.
Given these explanations for the declining docket, it is likely that the
current situation will endure for some time to come, unless or until significant
changes occur from new appointments to the Court. The consequences ofthe
changes in personnel to date have been so great that it would take a real and
sustained shift in the Court's direction to reverse them. Barring the appointment of ajurist whose approach to certiorari is cast in the highly unusual mold
of a Justice White or a Justice Douglas, it will take several new members with
a definite inclination to grant more cases to effect a substantial increase in the
Court's caseload. At the same time, the confirmed pattern of government
attorneys bringing fewer cases to the Court is likely to persist, for though they
can anticipate paddling into rougher waters again at some point in the fiture,
there is no apparent reason to believe that this will happen anytime soon. For
the time being, therefore, the Supreme Court's plenary docket has stabilized
at levels that are unprecedented in the modern era.

